United States Foreign Policies on Iran and Iraq, and the Negative Impact on the Kurdish Nationalist Movement: From the Nixon Era through the Reagan Years by Franklin, Janet A.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
Browse all Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
2019 
United States Foreign Policies on Iran and Iraq, and the Negative 
Impact on the Kurdish Nationalist Movement: From the Nixon Era 
through the Reagan Years 
Janet A. Franklin 
Wright State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all 
 Part of the History Commons 
Repository Citation 
Franklin, Janet A., "United States Foreign Policies on Iran and Iraq, and the Negative Impact on the Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement: From the Nixon Era through the Reagan Years" (2019). Browse all Theses and 
Dissertations. 2159. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/2159 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE 
Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICIES ON IRAN AND IRAQ, AND THE 
NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: FROM 







A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of  




JANET A. FRANKLIN 
























WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
April 30, 2019 
 
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY 
SUPERVISION BY Janet A. Franklin  ENTITLED  United States Foreign Policies on 
Iran and Iraq, and the Negative Impact on the Kurdish Nationalist Movement: From the 
Nixon Era through the Reagan Years BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. 
 
__________________________ 




Jonathan R. Winkler, Ph.D. 
Chair, History 
Committee on Final Examination: 
 
________________________________ 
Awad Halabi, Ph.D. 
 
________________________________ 
Jonathan R. Winkler, Ph.D. 
 
________________________________ 






Barry Milligan, Ph.D. 






Franklin, Janet A. M.A. Department of History, Wright State University, 2019. United 
States Foreign Policies on Iran and Iraq, and the Negative Impact on the Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement: From the Nixon Era through the Reagan Years. 
 
 
United States foreign policies on Iran and Iraq, during the later Cold War period, 
led to devastating consequences to Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and a separate 
nation-state.  By employing the Shah of Iran as one pillar of America’s proxy in the 
Persian Gulf, and after the Iranian Revolution, to then begin collaborating with Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq War, U.S. policies marginalized and negatively impacted Iraqi 
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Iraqi Kurds began lining up in front of polling places throughout the Kurdistan 
Region, Iraq, at 8 a.m. (local time) on September 25, 2017.  Armed with fresh victories 
against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) forces while assisting the Iraqi 
government win back territory lost to that militant group, the Iraqi Kurds felt their time 
had once again arrived to assert for self-governance.  The September 2017 election called 
for a vote on an advisory referendum, which would give the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) a mandate to achieve independence from Iraq.1  Overwhelmingly 
approved by 92.73 percent of the 3,305,925 eligible voters, the Iraqi Kurds felt sure they 
secured the pathway towards self-rule.2  Instead of accepting the legal right of 
expression, as exercised by the people of the Kurdistan Region in passing the advisory 
referendum, the Iraqi government deemed the vote unconstitutional and considered the 
move as a crime.3  Taking further action, Iraq sent forces into the region seizing the city 
of Kirkuk and other towns and cities, along with multiple oil fields, in the semi-
autonomous region.4  The United States, yet again, stood aside with the view that an 
1 Tamara Qiblawi, “Iraqi Kurdish referendum: What you need to know,” CNN, Irbil, Iraq, updated 5:10 PM 
ET, Sun September 24, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/24/middleeast/kurdish-referendum/index.html 
(accessed May 4, 2019). 
2 KRG Cabinet, “KHERC: Yes wins by 92.73 percent at Kurdistan independence referendum,” Kurdistan 
Regional Government, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq (cabinet.gov.krd), Thu, 28 Sep 2017 15:00, 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=55861 (accessed May 4, 2019). 
3 KRG Cabinet, “KRG Council of Ministers statement on Baghdad’s unconstitutional acts,” Kurdistan 
Regional Government, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq (cabinet.gov.krd), Fri, 29 Sep 2017 11:40, 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=55878 (accessed May 4, 2019) 
4 Jane Arraf, “After Iraqi Kurdish Independence Vote Backfires, ‘I Do Not Regret It,’ Says Barzani,” NPR, 
Politics & Policy, November 7, 2017, 1:11 PM ET, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/11/07/562514981/after-iraqi-kurdish-independence-vote-
backfires-i-do-not-regret-it-says-barzani (accessed May 4, 2019). 
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autonomous Kurdistan Region would destabilize the entire Middle East.5  Although a 
supporter of Iraqi Kurdish fighters against ISIS, the U.S. remained diplomatically 
detached and offered no advocacy for Kurdish statehood.6  A continuing pattern, the 
United States once more employed the Iraqi Kurds in fighting a perceived U.S. threat in 
the Persian Gulf region, currently ISIS, but averted the Iraqi Kurds’ long held quest for a 
separate nation-state.  Much of the deterrents to Kurdish self-rule in Iraq are enmeshed in 
policies established and imposed by American interventions in the region.  This study 
examines American foreign relations with Iran and Iraq, during the Nixon administration 
through the Reagan era, and the detrimental impact American policy had on the 
aspirations of Iraqi Kurds for statehood.  During this period, Iran shifted from ally to foe; 
conversely, Iraq transformed from being a Cold War opponent to a collaborator.  The 
shifts in American foreign policies on Iran and Iraq marginalized and negatively 
impacted Iraqi Kurds’ goal of independence. 
5 Krishnadev Calamur, “Why Doesn’t the U.S. Support Kurdish Independence?” The Atlantic, Global, Oct 
20, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/us-kurdish-independence/543540/ 
(accessed May 4, 2019). 
6 Calamur, “Why Doesn’t U.S. Support Kurdish Independence.”  
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In reviewing the literature, scholars of American foreign policy throughout the 
Cold War era have tended to depict the Kurdish nationalist movement as incidental in 
comparison to state actors.  Rashid Khalidi, Michael A. Palmer, Daniel J. Sargent, and 
Odd Arne Westad represent a few researchers that discuss the Cold War period and 
mention the Kurds in terms of their ancillary roles in the wars between Iran and Iraq.  In 
Iran, for example, academics perceived the Kurds as constituting a segment of the overall 
Iranian population.  Research into U.S.-Iranian relations treated the Kurds as one 
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minority group of several under the jurisdiction of the Iranian government, and treatment 
of U.S.-Kurdish relations resided as subset of the larger U.S.-Iranian policy.  The Iraqi 
Kurds were viewed in a similar manner.  Although recognition of the nationalist 
movement played a minor role in U.S.-Iraqi relations, the Iraqi Kurds held a negligible 
position to the larger U.S. policy on Iraq.  The materials utilized in this examination draw 
primarily from United States foreign policies on Iran and Iraq to elucidate the resulting 
effects on the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq.  Sources in this study, gathered from 
U.S. government documents, American newspaper articles, and books, address a series of 
questions that explore the changing dynamics of U.S.-Iranian and U.S.-Iraqi relations 
from 1969-1988, and how the shifts obstructed Iraqi Kurdish aims for statehood. 
Prior to America’s 2011 withdrawal from Iraq after the Iraq War (2003-2011), the 
region of Kurdistan subsisted geographically, economically, and politically marginalized.  
The Kurdistan region also lacked formal institutions to compile and house historical 
documents and artifacts, which hampered comprehensive inquiry.  More important, 
however, the provocative, rebellious behavior of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the 
associated countries created enormous difficulties in obtaining research materials, and 
thus made scholarship difficult.  The end of the Iraq War and the toppling of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime opened previously unavailable research opportunities by providing a 
safer environment and more open lines of communication between Iraqi Kurdistan and 
the West. 
One of the few researchers to explore the direct connection between the United 
States and the Kurds was Marianna Charountaki, an international relations scholar.  Her 
book, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International relations in the Middle East since 
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1945, examined U.S.-Kurdish relations by primarily focusing on the Kurd’s influence on 
American foreign policy from World War II until Gulf War III (March 2003).  
Charountaki’s expanded edition of her Ph.D. thesis (2009) concentrated on the 
interdependence of non-state and state actors in international relations.  She explained the 
Kurdish issue as multifaceted and complex in nature with internal and external 
dimensions that are dependent on the regional state powers.7  Charountaki analyzed the 
structure of American foreign policy making, particularly in how the formulating of 
policy related to non-state powers, in this case the Kurds, within the paradigm of 
increasing globalization.8  In covering a span of fifty eight years, she discussed pertinent 
periods of discourse and action to include the first direct meeting between U.S. 
government officials and Kurdish leaders in 1972, and the 1988 U.S. Congressional Bill 
authorizing sanctions against Iraq for the use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds.  
Charountaki also covered the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, and delineated how the Kurdish 
groups in each of the four countries have frequently been at odds, often exacerbated by 
regional and international powers.9  She relied on interviews with pertinent KDP, PUK, 
and KRG members and other Kurdish officials, U.S. governmental electronic sources, 
and U.S. congressional records and reports, along with periodicals, newspapers, and other 
media. 
While Charountaki discussed the Kurdish Issue in international relations terms, 
Mehrdad R. Izady and David McDowall chronicled the history of the Kurds.  Izady’s The 
Kurds: A Concise Handbook offered a primer on the Kurds, presenting a full range of 
7 Marianna Charountaki, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International relations in the Middle East 
since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 28. 
8 Charountaki, Kurds US Foreign Policy, 70. 
9 Ibid., 182. 
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themes from geographical information to cultural and arts material.  Although the book 
lacked a comprehensive bibliography, Izady incorporated documentation on the ancient 
and modern sources he used at the end of each chapter.  Notably, Izady delineated all of 
the Kurdish tribes and utilized his cartography skills to include numerous maps.  In 
addition, he presented detailed information on Kurdish religions, and described the high 
status given women in the Cult of Angels, which is one of several indigenous Kurdish 
faiths.  Also, he defined the importance of women in politics and the military.  In a 
section on the Kurdish national character, Izady attributed the faults of Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani to less admirable traits of the Kurds in general.   
Where Izady lacked information on contemporary political developments, 
McDowall’s The Modern History of the Kurds chronicled the history of the Kurds 
concentrating on the nineteenth through the late twentieth century.  McDowall paid 
particular attention to the nationalist movement, citing primary sources from the Public 
Record office in Great Britain and the United Nations, and incorporated secondary 
sources to include newspapers and periodicals.  In detail, McDowall reported on the 
internal struggles and rivalries within Kurdish society, along with the convergence of old 
tribal systems within the changing dynamics of newly established modern states.  Similar 
to Charountaki, McDowall highlighted the complexities of the nationalist movement 
within the context of regional governments, but he concentrated on the Kurdish 
perspective with comprehensive narratives on the development and interplay of the 
numerous nationalist movement groups.  McDowall, in his third edition of The Modern 
History of the Kurds, included appendices on the Kurds in Syria, Lebanon, and the 
Caucasus, which largely are absent from other studies. 
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The works of Marianna Charountaki, Mehrdad R. Izady, and David McDowall 
primarily covered the Kurds and the overall Kurdish nationalist movement.  Ofra 
Bengio’s The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State offered an examination of 
the Iraqi Kurdish drive for autonomy, and discussed the role the Kurdish movement 
played in shaping the ultimate collapse of the Baʿthist regime.  Exploring the internal and 
external deterrents to Kurdish nation building, Bengio assessed the degree to which the 
Iraqi Kurds succeeded.  Bengio utilized sources from British and Baʿthist archives; Iraqi 
and Kurdish newspapers; and, Baʿth and Kurdish documents, speeches by public figures, 
and official declarations to argue that the Iraqi Kurds continue to hold a crucial role in 
Iraq’s state building, especially after the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003. 
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett’s Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship, a comprehensive study ranging from 1958 through 1991, chronologically 
surveyed the history, politics, and international relations of Iraq.  While Bengio 
emphasized the impact of the Kurds on Iraqi politics, Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 
provided a more comprehensive view on Iraq, giving particular attention to the Iraqi 
Communist Party, fluctuating policies concerning the Kurds and Shi’a, and regional 
tensions.  The Slugletts posited that the attitudes of the various Iraqi administrations 
towards the Kurds were pragmatic and contentious in nature.  While different regimes 
attempted variously to incorporate the movement leaders into coalition governments, 
offer a form of Kurdish autonomy, and force displacement of the Iraqi Kurds, the 
Slugletts offered a neutral position on the nationalist movement.  They neither described 
the Kurds as victims nor as glorified rebels.  The Slugletts used unpublished theses, 
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newspapers, and an array of secondary sources, along with their own research, to present 
a socioeconomic history of Iraq.   
Phebe Marr’s third edition of The Modern History of Iraq also reviewed the 
history of Iraq, but highlighted Iraq’s pursuit of a national identity and struggle for 
modernity.  Marr began her study with the monarchial period (1921), after providing a 
brief historical synopsis of the land and people of Iraq, and carried her examination 
through 2011.  Contributing to the current literature on Iraq by scrutinizing economic and 
social changes occurring during the twentieth century, Marr delved into the relationships 
between Sunni and Shi’a, and Arab and Kurd, along with the political dimensions 
enmeshed in the development of the state.  She described the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, in balanced terms, as one of several factors eroding national unity.  Marr 
capitalized on her own research, memoirs, works in Arabic, as well as English and other 
Western languages sources. 
 Taking a slightly different approach to Marr, Tripp’s second edition of A History 
of Iraq examined the country through the lenses of patrimonialism, the political economy 
of oil, and the use of violence in the making of modern day Iraq.  According to Tripp, 
“Indeed, control of the means of violence has been one of the lures for those who seized 
the state apparatus.”10  Tripp discussed the military and economic power of the Sunni 
Arab minority over the majority Shi’a and Kurdish populations, often with severe 
consequences.  He demonstrated the use of governmental violence against the citizenry 
by relating the experiences of the Iraqi Kurds to include forceful expulsions, mass 
executions, and gassing of whole villages.  Tripp utilized archival records housed in 
10 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6. 
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England, India, and the United States, and cited numerous memoirs and secondary 
sources in his narrative. 
 The perspectives presented by the preceding authors centered on the Iraqi Kurds 
and Iraq, specifically the Kurdish influence in the region.  Roham Alvandi’s Nixon, 
Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War took a different 
position that assessed U.S.-Iranian relations, which implicated the Kurdish nationalist 
movement during the Shatt al-‘Arab border dispute (1969-1975).  Alvandi challenged the 
view that the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was America’s proxy in the Persian 
Gulf region.  He posited that the Shah developed a partnership with President Richard 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor, to contain Soviet influence 
and establish Iran as the regional leader.  Alvandi illuminated the view from Tehran of 
U.S.-Iranian relations and the crucial role the Iraqi Kurds played in the Shah’s political 
maneuverings.11  He used Persian-language sources, declassified presidential papers, and 
documents produced by Kissinger and Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence 
(1966-1973) to assert his viewpoint. 
 Bryan R. Gibson’s Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold 
War asserted that U.S. policy toward Iraq, between 1958 and 1975, was based on Cold 
War concerns and denying Soviet influence in the country.  He demonstrated how 
reliance on the Pike Report, the findings of the 1975 Pike Committee, headed by U.S. 
Representative Otis G. Pike, distorted historians perception of the events during the 
period.  The report claimed that secret U.S. financial support was given to the Iraqi 
Kurds.  Gibson used declassified government materials, interviews with government 
11 Janet A. Franklin, “Final Essay: The First Exploitation of the Kurds by the United States: 1972” (HST 
7330-01, December 17, 2015), 2. 
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officials, and numerous secondary sources to redress historiographical deficiencies, and 
to provide a more accurate account of how U.S. decisions and actions were based on a 
“single, unifying perception: the Soviet Union posed a threat to Iraq’s sovereignty.”12 
  Bruce W. Jentleson’s With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 
1982-1990 maintained that the policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations towards 
Iraq were based on flawed assumptions.  Where Gibson highlighted weaknesses in 
historiography, Jentleson asserted that both presidents made conjectures based on the 
premise that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”13  According to Jentleson, Reagan 
and Bush devised policies on the basic presumption that Saddam Hussein would pivot 
towards the United States during the period of the Iran-Iraq War, and by doing so, 
provide regional stability by ceasing to instigate terrorism and playing a role in Arab-
Israeli peace settlements.  Jentleson employed government documents, interviews, 
hearing transcripts, and newspaper articles to present his argument. 
 This study contributes to the existing literature on the subject of how United 
States foreign policies in Iran and Iraq negatively impacted the Kurdish nationalist 
movement in Iraq during the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy 
Carter, and Ronald Reagan.  By chronologically examining the policy decisions 
employed during the sixteen year period, a picture emerged of the detrimental effects of 
those strategies on the Iraqi Kurds’ ambition for statehood.  The primary sources used in 
this paper include declassified government documents electronically obtained from the 
Foreign Relations of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Freedom of 
12 Bryan R. Gibson, Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), xxii. 
13 Bruce W. Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1994), 15. 
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Information Act Electronic Reading Room, and electronic copies of reports obtained 
from the United Nations Security Council.  In addition, articles from the village VOICE 
and the New York Times offered pertinent government disclosures, and interviews with 
federal and military officials, respectively, from the Nixon and Reagan administrations.  
The memoirs of Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger provide first hand perspectives 
of key government officials from the beginning of direct U.S.-Kurdish relations.  The 
materials utilized in this examination bring to light an evolving U.S. strategy in policy 






























II. THE KURDS 
“No friends but the mountains” is a common refrain heard expressed about, and 
by, the Kurds.  The Zagros Mountains, extending from southeast Turkey, through 
northeast Iraq, and running down along the western border of Iran to the Strait of 
Hormuz, offered sanctuary to the various Kurdish tribes in times of conquests, conflicts, 
and threats from perceived enemies for more than four millennia.  Although they are one 
of a multitude of groups worldwide pursuing independence and statehood, such as the 
Palestinians, the Basque, the Tibetans, and the Rohingyas, the Kurds assert a special 
distinction as being “the world’s largest ethnic group without their own homeland,” 
according to The Kurdish Project, a digital based cultural-education initiative to raise 
awareness of Kurdish people.14  The northern regions of the Zagros, an unhospitable 
expanse, provided the Kurds with not only shelter, but allowed for the continuation of 
their semi-nomadic lifestyle. 
Claiming lineage from the ancient Medes, a people of Indo-Iranian origin, whom 
they proudly proclaim ancestry in the Kurdish national anthem, the Kurds are more likely 
an intermingling of various peoples moving through the Kurdistan region in prehistoric 
times.15  One of several Kurdish origin myths include the Kurds descending from 
14 The Kurdish Project, “Latest News, For Iraq’s Long-Suffering Kurds, Independence Beckons,” posted 
September 11, 2017, https://thekurdishproject.org/latest-news/iraqs-long-suffering-kurds-independence-
beckons/ (accessed September 29, 2017). 
15 Dildar (Yonis Reuf), “Ey Reqîb (Kurdish national anthem),” Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iraq, KDP 
International Site, http://www.kdp.se/lder.html (accessed October 1, 2017). 
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children who escaped into the mountains to hide from Zahhak, a child-eating monster.16  
Another legend claims the Kurds are the progenies of jinn, supernatural creatures, and 
slave girls from King Solomon’s court driven into the mountains by the angry king.17  
Called Cyrtii in the second century, a name initially applied to Seleucid or Parthian 
mercenary slinger (those trained in using slings as weapons), it is unclear if the term 
specified a distinctive linguistic or ethnic group.18  But by the seventh century CE, at the 
beginning of the Islamic era, the Arabs who conquered the region started using the term 
“Kurds,” which held a socio-economic meaning, to refer to the area’s mountain people.  
Among leading Muslim historians in the tenth century CE, the use of “Kurds” to refer to 
the Zagros inhabitants became more widespread, thus helping to propagate the name.19  
Essentially, the Kurds are an Indo-European speaking people, closely related culturally 
and linguistically to the Iranian peoples.20  As a non-Arab ethnic group, they inhabit a 
contiguous area of southeastern Turkey, western Iran, northern Syria, and northern Iraq. 
While many languages are spoken in the Kurdish regions, the main Kurdish 
dialects are Kurmanji, Sorani, and Southern Kurdish.  Kurmanji, used most prevalently in 
the northern sections of Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, and Turkey, is spoken by 
approximately 65 percent of all Kurds.  In Iraq, Kurmanji is known as “Behdini.”21  
Sorani is commonly spoken in parts of Iraq and Iran.  According to The Kurdish Project, 
less than 25 percent of all Kurds speak Sorani, but it is “the dialect with the most well 
16 David McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), 4. 
17 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: the Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and 
Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3. 
18 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 9. 
19 Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 2. 
20 Gunter, Kurds Ascending, 1. 
21 The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-culture/kurdish-language/ 
(accessed January 29, 2018). 
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developed literary tradition in modern times.”22  The regions with Sorani speakers 
allowed for the dialect to be taught and used in the educational systems, hence the 
advancement of Sorani literary.  Southern Kurdish, the third regional dialect, is 
comprised of nine subdialects spoken in Iran and parts of Iraq.  The Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG), established in 1992 as a Parliamentary Democracy within the 
federated Republic of Iraq, recognizes both Kurmanji and Sorani.23 
 Similar to the differences in languages, various religions are practiced among the 
Kurds to include Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.  The majority of Kurds identify as 
Sunni Muslims with a minority being Shi’a, or approximately 15 percent of the total 
Kurdish population.24  Alevism, a branch of Shi’a Islam that incorporates Sufism, the 
mystical element of Islam, is also practiced by a small segment of Kurds, particularly in 
Turkey.  An even smaller group of Kurds adhere to Yezidism, a conglomeration of 
ancient pagan beliefs, Zoroastrianism and Mithraism, Manichaean gnosis (founded by the 
Iranian prophet Mani, c. 216-276 CE), and superimposed with elements of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam.25  Until the creation of Israel, the region of Kurdistan held a 
significant minority of Kurdish Jews, but most emigrated to Israel after World War II.26  
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Christian organizations in Europe and the 
United States revived interest in carrying missionary work to the Kurdistan region.27 
22 The Kurdish Project 
23 Ibid. 
24 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 11. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington, D.C.: Taylor & Francis International 
Publishers, 1992), 162. 
27 Izady, Kurds, 164. 
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Today, approximately 25 to 35 million Kurds live in the region of Kurdistan, and 
make up the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East.28  In Iraq, the Kurdish 
population is estimated to be 15 to 20 percent of the total populace.  The region of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, located in the north of Iraq and often referred to as Southern Kurdistan, is 
governed by the KRG.  Its capital is Erbil.  Today, the KRG and the U.S. enjoy an open 
and favorable relationship. 
 
Figure 2. Map of Iraq. https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iraq.html 
 
28 “Who are the Kurds?” BBC News, October 31, 2017, under “News World Middle East,” 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440 (accessed December 3, 2017). 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, of which the Kurds were a part, marked the 
beginning of greater Western influence in the territories formerly occupied by the 
caliphate.  Sensing an eventual victory in World War I, the United Kingdom and France 
with approval from the Russian Empire, secretly agreed to the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
(1916), an arrangement that allocated spheres of influence and control in the Ottoman 
controlled regions of the Middle East.  After the war’s end, the Allied Powers formulated 
a partitioning plan, The Treaty of Sevres (1920), based on the Sykes-Picot.  The 
agreement incorporated a provision for an independent Kurdistan, but disputes over 
boundary lines and a Turkish rebellion nullified the treaty.  Consequently, the Treaty of 
Lausanne (1923) officially formalized the division of the former empire, and divided up 
the Kurdistan region leaving the Kurds without a self-ruled state. Instead, Kurdish 
territory was allocated to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.29  During the post war 
negotiations, the majority of Kurds had not fully rallied around a political, nationalist 
leader or unified around a common nationalistic cause.  A newly emerging non-tribal 
educated professional class had not yet marshalled the Kurds as a unified people to 
advocate for a separate, autonomous state.30  Tribal structure, intertribal differences, and 
poor communications factored greatly into the state of Kurdish affairs.   
The interwar period, from the Treaty of Lausanne to the onset of World War II, 
found the appointed central governments controlling the Kurdistan regions attempting to 
crush, suppress, or mute Kurdish political power and nationalist activities.  Pockets of 
Kurdish resistance to regional authorities persisted, as it had during the Ottoman reign, 
29 Gunter, Kurds Ascending, 11-12. 
30 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 151. 
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but fresh uncertainties rising from the evolving political realities of the new regimes now 
in control magnified the struggle.  The Treaty of Sevres had, after all, acknowledged 
Kurdish aims for an independent state on an international level.  As with many entities 
forming new power bases, a jostling for authority and control often leads to greater 
marginalization of groups that previously held sway or some form of influence.  The 
Kurds exemplified that struggle to hold on to the little autonomy they possessed.   
During the Ottoman period, the Kurds had established some semblance of self-
rule within the central power structure, although they continued to push for greater 
independence.  The newly recognized governments of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq wrestled 
with how to address their Kurdish populations within the regional dynamics existing at 
the time.  The main objective in both Turkey and Iran rested on exerting central authority 
throughout the entire state.  Turkey expunged all references to Kurdistan from official 
records, renamed Kurdish places in Turkish, demanded the sole use of Turkish in courts 
of law, and officially barred the use of Kurdish dialects in schools.31  As well, the 
Turkish government embarked on a program of resettling Kurds in non-Kurdish western 
regions of the country.32  Clearly, the aim of Turkey’s government centered on creating a 
single national identity—Turkish—to strengthen its position.  The measures were 
intended to assimilate the Kurds into the national Turkish character and deny them a 
Kurdish identity, but the actions of the government had the opposite effect.  Instead, the 
push for a Turkish national identity helped intensify the Kurdish nationalist movement.  
Because of the denial of a Kurdish identity, along with a lack of any economic 
development in Turkey’s Kurdistan region after the war, a Kurdish nationalist movement 
31 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 191-192. 
32 Charountaki, Kurds US Foreign Policy, 45. 
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there developed along different lines.  As such, this paper addresses only the Kurdish 
nationalist movement as it pertains to Iraqi Kurds. 
KURDS IN IRAN 
In Iran, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds experienced a similar, 
but less severe, pattern of treatment as the Turkish Kurds.  The Iranian central 
government, a theocratic regime led by Reza Shah Pahlavi, held that the Kurds shared 
Persian ancestry, therefore no overt need to extinguish Kurdish identity.  But that 
common ancestry still excluded Iranian Kurds, who made up approximately 7 percent of 
the Iranian population, from participation in politics, and the prohibition of the Kurdish 
dialects in education, publications, and public speech.33  As Reza Shah amassed his 
power, he put into place new policies that forced young men into conscription, demanded 
a uniform European dress code, changed land registration laws to favor local aghas (tribal 
chieftains or village leaders), prohibited tribal migration, and attempted to disarm the 
tribes on the border regions.34  He also embarked on modernization programs that 
benefited urban areas, but left the mountainous countryside untouched.  In essence, Reza 
Shah enacted strict measures to subordinate the Kurds to central authority.  Again, the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran diverged from that experienced in other regions of 
Kurdistan, thus a discussion on Iranian Kurds will give way to the Iraqi Kurdish 
nationalist movement. 
KURDS IN IRAQ 
In Iraq, created under British mandate in 1921, the Kurds fared better than their 
counterparts in other regions of Kurdistan.  Although the Kurds assumed autonomy 
33 Nader Entessar, Kurdish Politics in the Middle East (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 17-18. 
34 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 224-225. 
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would be granted through the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey’s rebellion and subsequent 
independence left the treaty unratified and placed into question the jurisdiction of the 
Kurdish vilayet (province) of Mosul.  In the debate on the disposition of Mosul, the 
British questioned their initial backing of an independent Kurdish state, which would 
incorporate the vilayet, and what that would do to the stability of an emerging pro-
Western Turkey.  Also, London knew of significant oil fields in the Mosul region.  At 
that time, oil was just becoming an ever more crucial commodity that Western powers 
deemed necessary for the security.  If Mosul went to Turkey, it would mean losing the 
most oil productive region of Iraq.  Unsure of placing the province in an independent and 
unpredictable Kurdish state, the prevailing thought in Britain eventually determined that 
without Mosul, Iraq would suffer economically and put British interests at risk.35  When 
British-Turkish negotiations failed to reach an agreement on the vilayet, the Council of 
the League of Nations, in 1926, conferred Mosul to Iraq with stipulations benefiting the 
Kurds, specifically the Local Languages Law, allowing both Arabic and Kurdish as the 
official languages, and political representation in the region.36  Unfortunately for the Iraqi 
Kurds, those guarantees failed to materialize in practice.  Nonetheless, for the first time, 
the Iraqi government acknowledged Kurdish cultural rights and separate identity.  By the 
time Iraq gained independence from Britain in 1932, numerous Kurdish tribal uprisings 
befell the country as the Kurds rebelled against British and Arab rule.  While Iraqi Kurds’ 
independent state folded before it had a chance to materialize, their ambitions for self-
governance continued.        
35 Entessar, Kurdish Politics, 70. 
36 Ibid., 72. 
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During the same period, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq experienced tense relations with 
one another as the Kurds used the porous borders to escape from the battles and 
skirmishes they initiated, mainly against Iraq.  The fleeing Kurds used the neighboring 
territories as bases of operations and to regroup.  As such, Turkey feared Iranian 
incursions into Turkish territory to retaliate against the revolting Kurds concealed there, 
while Iran felt threatened that the British in Iraq would do the same to them.37  Initially, 
each country utilized the Kurds to cause trouble with their neighbors.  In July 1937, 
however, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq agreed to a pact of cooperation and to abide by existing 
borders, thus ending the practice of inciting the Kurds against each other.38  The 
agreement added another layer of difficulty for the Kurds struggling for autonomy as 
their ability to freely flee across open borders no longer existed. 
REBELLIOUS KURDS 
While new state governments were dealing with their rebellious Kurdish 
minorities, the Kurds were fighting internally among themselves.  Various tribes were 
contesting the influence of neighboring clans and pushing back against the current order 
of affairs.  Historically, tribalism played an integral part in the governance of the 
Kurdistan region.  Also, a new class of Kurdish urban intellectuals began questioning the 
authority of tribal aghas and attempted to diminish rural power.  At the same time, within 
tribal groups, rival chiefs vied for control.  Several Kurdish tribal leaders pushed for 
greater political autonomy within their newly ascribed regions, while others preferred to 
acquiesce to central authorities for the potential advantages of siding with the new 
governments of Turkey and Iraq, and in Iran. 
37 Ibid. 
38 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 226. 
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Kurdish tribes possessed relative autonomy under Ottoman rule.  With the 
collapse of the empire, a few Kurdish tribal leaders saw an opportunity to press for self-
rule.  Shaikh Saʾid, a chief of the Sunni Naqshbandi Sufi order, led a rebellion against the 
nascent republic of Turkey in 1925.39  In Iran, Ismail Agha Simko, chief of the Shakkak 
tribe, conducted several uprisings from 1920 to 1930, when he finally succumbed to 
Iranian forces.40  Shaikh Mahmoud of the Barzanji tribe, declared himself king of an 
independent Kurdistan, in the Sulaymaniyah region, in 1922.  Although the British made 
Mahmoud governor of Sulaymaniyah for a short period of time, from 1922 until 1924, his 
ultimate goal centered on creating an autonomous state.  Shaikh Mahmoud’s ambitions 
unsettled other Kurdish tribal leaders who saw his form of governance no less 
authoritarian than that of the British or Iraqis.  After a forceful removal by British and 
Iraqi forces, Mahmoud continued to harass British and Iraqi authorities from an Iranian 
base until his final capture in 1932.  Unable to unify around a single, charismatic leader 
with political savvy to rally the numerous tribes around a nationalist movement, the 
Kurds lost out to larger, regional powers. 
IMPORTANCE OF OIL AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COLD WAR 
After World War I and the lead up to World War II, American interests in the 
Middle East hinged on commercial interests rather than on security concerns.  Oil, the 
new source of energy, powered the military victory of the Allies in the Great War and 
helped shape the division of the region afterwards.  The United States neither declared 
war on the Ottomans nor participated in the League of Nations Treaty, and therefore 
39 Izady, Kurds, 61. 
40 Entessar, Kurdish Politics, 17. 
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reaped no benefits from the mandate system.41  Instead, the U.S. deferred to Great 
Britain’s political and military dominance in the Middle East, while at the same time 
hoping to capitalize on the economic benefits from oil revenues.  Although the U.S. 
remained the largest producer and exporter of oil, American oil companies wanted in on 
the commercial activities being negotiated in the Persian Gulf.42  With the outbreak of 
World War II, the subsequent decline in Britain’s economic power, and a renewed look at 
the strategic importance of the Middle East, America’s interest in Persian Gulf oil 
increased dramatically.43  The United States government resolved to take a leading role in 
the development of the Middle East oil industry.  
In the direct aftermath of World War II, the U.S. concluded it was vital to national 
security to safeguard access to the oil reserves in the Middle East and prevent the spread 
of Soviet influence in the region.  As part of the plan to secure these goals, the U.S. 
reinvigorated the Arabian-America Oil Company (ARAMCO) with an innovative 
financial agreement, dispatched U.S. Marines to occupy Beirut for three months to 
suppress an uprising in 1958, and backed American friendly regimes in Jordan, Syria, and 
the Persian Gulf.44  Perhaps one of the most striking American actions involved the 
authorizing of a 1953 joint clandestine operation, conducted by the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service, to overthrow the 
government of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Prime Minister of Iran.45  Dwight D. 
41 Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 
1833-1992 (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1992), 16. 
42 Palmer, Guardians Gulf, 20. 
43 Ibid., 25. 
44 Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Washington, 
D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 10, 43, 46. 
45 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 161.  
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Eisenhower’s administration feared Mosaddeq’s growing alliance with the communist 
Tudeh Party and his increasing overtures to the Soviet Union for aid was an attempt to 
open the door for a Soviet takeover of the Iranian pro-Western shah, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi.46  These American interests and actions in maintaining access to oil and 
preventing the Soviets from expanding into the area ensnared the Kurdish nationalist 
movement.   
An early example of how the Soviets demonstrated their expansionist goals, and 
in the process enmeshed the Kurds, occurred in a region encompassed by Iranian 
Kurdistan.  Allied forces had agreed to leave northern Iran within six months of the end 
of World War II.  March 2, 1946, was the departure deadline established by the 
agreement.47  The Americans pulled out ahead of time and the British withdrew on 
schedule, but the Soviets capitalized on the opportunity and remained in the area.    
Robert Rossow, Jr., American Vice-Consul in charge of the U.S. Consulate in Tabriz 
(1945-1946), and Chief of the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (1946-
1947), remarked, “One may fairly say that the Cold War began on March 4, 1946.”48  
Instead of departing on the prescribed date, the Soviets sent more troops into the region 
two days later.  Iranian Kurdistan’s significance pertained to its proximity to the Soviet 
border, the potential of oil fields within its territory, and the political disruption caused by 
Soviet encroachment into Iran, a sovereign nation.49  Moscow’s actions, coupled with a 
simultaneous and similar move on Turkey’s border, substantiated George Kennan’s, the 
46 Kinzer, All Shah’s Men, 4. 
47 Hahn, Crisis Crossfire, 5-6. 
48 Robert Rosso, Jr., “The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946, The Middle East Journal 10, no.1 (Winter 1956), 
http://www.jstor.org.exproxy.libraries.wright.edu/stable/4322770 (accessed February 19, 2018): 17. 
49 Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2009), 52. 
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American Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, warning of Soviet hostility towards the West in 
his famous “Long Telegram.”  During Soviet presence in the region, particularly from 
December 1945 until Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin ordered his troops to leave in May 
1946, the Soviets encouraged and protected a secessionist movement in Azerbaijan and in 
Eastern Kurdistan.50  A group of Kurdish nationalists, under the leadership of Qazi 
Muhammad of Mahabad, took advantage of the political dynamics and reinvigorated the 
early twentieth-century campaign for independence and statehood, much to the 
consternation of the U.S., British, and Iranian governments because of direct Soviet 
involvement.51  With the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Kurdish nationalist movement 
was effectively suppressed by the Iranian government on December 15, 1946.52  From 
the perspective of the United States, the expansionist behavior exhibited by the Soviets in 
Iran justified a response in the newly developing Cold War strategy of containment.  The 
events described provide an early example of how the Iraqi Kurds entered into Cold War 
rivalries. 
REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD 
The short lived Republic of Mahabad (1946) in Iranian Kurdistan, demonstrated 
that a segment of the Kurdish population continued to harbor nationalist ambitions.  
Instigated and supported by the Soviets, a group of leading Kurdish chiefs established a 
self-governing region and set down a series of six objectives.  The primary aim called for 
autonomy for Iranian Kurds within the state of Iran.53  The formation of the republic 
started the coalescing of divergent Kurdish groups and set course for a more unified 
50 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 241. 
51 Ibid., 240. 
52 Ibid., 244. 
53 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 241. 
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nationalist movement.  Although the Republic of Mahabad lasted for less than a year, the 
Iraqi Kurds, under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, immerged as a major force 
in the campaign for self-rule. 
THE COLD WAR AND REGIME CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Cold War marshaled in a new era of conflict that effected innumerable 
amounts of changes and upheavals throughout the world.  Older traditional systems of 
governance collided with new ideologies causing governments worldwide to inwardly 
reflect on how best to rebuild in the postwar environment.  Leery of the Soviets during 
wartime, the tensions between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics grew in intensity as the Soviet government pressed for legitimacy in the 
international community.  The Soviet system advocated an ideology of Marxism-
Leninism that centered on state control of property and economic activity, and challenged 
America’s democratic institution which championed individual liberty and capitalism.  
As demonstrated earlier in Iran, the Middle East became entangled in the ideological 
battle between the two superpowers.  The U.S. strategy of containment encompassed 
shoring up regional governments that favored and supported American policy, 
particularly those countries rich in oil reserves and that bordered the Soviet Union. 
In addition to the global implications of the Cold War in the Middle East, the 
creation of Israel in 1948 produced tremendous regional tensions and conflicts between 
Arabs and Israelis.  One of the outcomes of the formation of an independent Zionist state 
resulted in a heightened awareness and the popularity of Arab nationalism, which gained 
strength and pushed back against Western imperialism.  Egypt’s Gamal Abd al-Nasser 
proposed positive neutrality in the Cold War ideological battle in the Middle East, and 
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actively pursued his nonalignment agenda.  The region was fraught with discord.  Some 
independent states aligned with the West in the Cold War, while others adopted Nasser’s 
stance of nonalignment, which afforded negotiations with the Soviet Union without 
having to subscribe to their ideology.  As well, a number of Middle Eastern countries 
contested the regional powers of rivals.  Many states suffered from internal dissentions as 
various political factions vied for power within state governments, such as the civil war 
in Lebanon, the coup in Iraq, and the struggles associated with the changing monarchy in 
Jordan.  All of this created global and regional levels of upheaval that drew in the Kurds. 
Nearly landlocked, Iraq shares a common border with Iran.  Since the sixteenth 
century, the two countries have engaged in bitter territorial disputes over the Shatt al-
ʿArab, which is Iraq’s only open water access.  During the Mandate of Iraq, the thalweg 
principle, a boundary established using the lowest part of the riverbed, determined the 
border between the two countries, thus giving Iraq majority control over the waterway.  
In 1937, after Iraq gained independence, Iran and Iraq signed the Iran-Iraq Frontier 
Treaty acknowledging the official waterway divide between the two countries, although 
some factions within the Iraqi government protested the agreement over losing some 
control to Iran.54  The signed treaty also paved the way for an alliance, the Saadabad Pact 
(1937), between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, to counter Soviet encroachment.  
Until the 1958 Iraqi military coup that toppled the monarchy, Iraq and Iran coexisted in 
relative peace.  The two countries, joined by Turkey, Pakistan, and Britain, formed the 
Baghdad Pact (1955), an anti-Soviet defense partnership.55  At the time, both Iraq and 
Iran were steadfastly anti-communist and pro-Western.  But the Iraqi coup brought to 
54 Tripp, History Iraq, 90. 
55 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), 74. 
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power ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim who established a new decisively anti-Western regime.56  In 
1959, Iraq broke with the Baghdad Pact.  The new Iraqi regime increasingly turned to the 
Soviet Union for foreign aid and military supplies.57  Relations between Iraq and Iran 
deteriorated rapidly in the evolving political atmosphere.  The Iranian government of 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became progressively concerned that Qasim’s regime would 
escalate the again contested Shatt al-ʿArab agreement, which could lead to all out warfare 
between the two nations, and ultimately threaten the sovereignty of Iran.58   
 
Figure 3. Shatt al-ʿArab. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Iran-Iraq_Shatt_al-
Arab_Boundries.jpg 
 
When Qasim came to power, he offered amnesty to Mullah Mustafa Barzani, 
Kurdish leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) founded in 1946, who had been 
56 Tripp, History Iraq, 148. 




                                                 
in exile in the Soviet Union since 1946.59  For Qasim, the 1958 move to bring Barzani 
back was a means to help shore up his base within the Iraqi government.  In Qasim’s 
amnesty offer, he promised the Kurds a certain level of autonomy, but failed to carry 
through with his pledge.  As such, a deep chasm developed between the Iraqi government 
and the Kurds, and open warfare eventually broke out in the early fall of 1961, mainly in 
the northern tribal regions of Iraqi Kurdistan.60  For Iran’s part, the Shah seized the 
opportunity and initiated overtures of support to Barzani, by means of goods and arms, in 
support of the Kurds’ rebellion against the Iraqi regime.61  The Shah hoped to weaken 
Iraq’s military abilities and to keep the Iraqi government preoccupied in Kurdistan.  The 
once congenial relationship between Iran and Iraq disintegrated into firm adversaries.   
Within this Cold War and provincial milieu, the Kurdish nationalist movement disrupted 
and became embroiled in internal politics in both Iran and Iraq. 
The Iraqi break from the Baghdad Pact, and subsequent turn to the Soviets for 
economic and military support, caused great consternation within the United States 
government.  Qasim’s attempt to strengthen his military regime with a number of internal 
policies changes, such as land reform, revisions of the personal status law, and education 
reform, instead instigated more religious and ethnic rebellions.62  Internationally, Qasim 
asserted claim to the newly independent state of Kuwait in June 1961, which he 
proclaimed historically belonged to Iraq.  He then passed Public Law 80, in December 
1961, which effectively took 99.5 percent control of Iraq Petroleum Company’s (IPC) 
59 Gibson, Sold Out? 9. 
60 Tripp, History Iraq, 163. 
61 Ibid., 165. 
62 Marr, Modern History Iraq, 98-100. 
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concession territory without compensation.63  Qasim’s actions placed his regime in a 
precarious situation both internally and internationally.  The Kurdish uprising in the north 
diminished his ability to act militarily on his claim to Kuwait.  Internationally, the Kuwait 
assertion and the removal of foreign control of oil placed Qasim’s government at odds 
with Britain, the United States, and other Arab countries.   
Qasim’s government was toppled in February 1963 by the Baʿthists.64  The Baʿth, 
meaning rebirth or resurrection, was a pan-Arab political party founded in Syria (1946) 
that burgeoned in Iraq in the 1950s.65  When the Baʿthists came into power, the U.S. 
administration of Lyndon B. Johnson maintained a watchful eye on Iraq’s situation and 
continued the U.S. policy of nonintervention, along with a passive support for Arab 
unification, in which the new Iraqi regime was aligned.66  The Six Day War (June 5-10, 
1967), however, changed the dynamics between the United States and Iraq.  The Iraqi 
regime, having sent a token force in the battle between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan, severed all diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain because of 
their complicit alignment with Israel during the war.67 
During Richard M. Nixon’s bid for the U.S. presidency, the Arab Socialist Baʿth 
Party, led by Hasan al-Bakr, seized control of the Iraqi government.68  On July 30, 1968, 
just two weeks after grabbing power, al-Bakr expelled all non-Baʿthist allies from 
political office.69  For the next thirty-five years, the Baʿthists remained in control of the 
63 Ibid., 101. 
64 Ibid., 116. 
65 Marr, Modern History Iraq, 430. 
66 Hahn, Crisis Crossfire, 49-50. 
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Iraqi government.  The move also marked Saddam Hussein’s, al-Bakr’s kinsman, rise to 
power. 
While Iraq experienced numerous regime changes, Iranian-Iraqi affairs remained 
adversarial, and U.S.-Iraqi diplomacy deteriorated, the United States and Iran 
experienced a strengthening of ties.  Since the mid-nineteenth century, the U.S. and Iran 
enjoyed a cordial relationship.70  After the forced abdication of his father during World 
War II, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was installed on the throne and aligned his government 
with the Allies.  Subsequent to the Soviet incursion into Iran, along with other 
antagonistic moves by the Soviets in Greece and Turkey (1946), President Harry S. 
Truman announced, during his 1949 inaugural address, his Point Four Program.  As part 
of his containment policy of Soviet communism, Truman supplied U.S. technical and 
economic assistance to developing countries.71  The Shah of Iran regarded the amount of 
economic aid he received insubstantial, especially compared to his counterparts in Greece 
and Turkey.  As such, the Shah relied on Iran’s share of oil profits, which the Iranian 
Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara attempted to renegotiate with the British-owned Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in July 1949, to fend off another Soviet incursion and 
communist subversion.72  The fact that Britain continued to be in control of the AIOC, 
and the general feeling that the prime minister acquiesced to British interests, contributed 
to the rise of nationalism in Iran.  The assassination of Razmara by a radical Islamist 
70 Hahn, Crisis Crossfire, 4. 
71 Roham, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (2014), 
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group on March 7, 1951, provided the impetus for the Majlis (Iranian parliament) to 
nationalize the AIOC and elect Mohammad Mosaddeq as Prime Minister.73 
As previously discussed, the U.S. became alarmed by Mosaddeq’s increasing 
alliance with the Tudeh Party and overtures to the Soviet Union.  Consequently, the 1953 
sanctioned coup that ousted Mosaddeq from office enabled the Shah to gain tighter 
controls over the Iranian government.  It also greatly increased U.S. involvement in Iran.  
Under the Eisenhower administration, economic aid to Iran increased 665% and military 
assistance amplified by 341%.74  In August of 1954, the new National Iranian Oil 
Company signed an agreement with an international consortium of oil producers, which 
split oil profits fifty-fifty between the consortium and Iran.75  The move ended the British 
monopoly on Iranian oil, and gave the Shah additional means to stabilize Iran’s economy 
and consolidate his power.  In 1955, the Shah signed the Baghdad Pact, which firmly 
aligned Iran with the West.  When Iraq broke with the pact, the Shah used Iraq’s 
realignment toward the Soviets to press for even more U.S. security guarantees.  At this 
juncture in Iranian-Iraqi relations, the Shah made his first approach to Barzani with a 
proposal of monetary and arms support in the Kurds’ fight against the Qasim regime.  By 
doing so, the Shah hoped to diminish Qasim’s ability to act on his renewed claims to the 
Shatt al-Arab and on Iran’s oil-rich province of Khuzestan.76  Throughout the decade, the 
Shah’s growing unpopularity caused grave concerns within the Eisenhower 
administration for the regime’s stability.  Nonetheless, the U.S. continued the flow of aid 
to Iran to maintain the West’s influence over the Shah.  The succeeding administrations 
73 Ibid. 
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of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson sustained the supply of weaponry and 
economic assistance, all the while encouraging the Shah towards reform and moderation 
efforts.77 
BRITAIN’S DEPARTURE  
In 1968, Britain announced it would militarily withdraw from the Gulf region by 
1971.  Since the nineteenth century, Britain had been the dominate force in the region.  
But the Six Day War, and the ensuing Arab oil boycott coupled with the closing of the 
Suez Canal, took an enormous economic toll on Britain.78  It could no longer see a 
feasible way to sustain what was left of the empire in the Middle East.  The British 
Cabinet had debated the move for over a year before making the formal announcement.  
The declaration caught the United States off guard.79  Johnson and his advisors had scant 
time to formulate a new Middle Eastern policy given that the U.S. had heavily relied on 
Britain’s authority in the region and maintained a position of nonintervention in the 
region.  In formulating a plan to fill the impending void, and amid growing American 
domestic pressure against direct military intervention in Asia and the Middle East, the 
Johnson administration favored a proposal discussed in Britain of installing regional 
powers to fill their role.80  Both Iran and Iraq individually hoped to take on the function 
of regional power.81  After careful consideration of the regional dynamics, and possible 
repercussions, the new administration of Richard M. Nixon engaged the Shah of Iran in 
providing security in the Gulf as part of his Nixon Doctrine (1969), whereby the U.S. 
77 Charountaki, Kurds US Foreign Policy, 87. 
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delivered military and economic aid to U.S. allied countries threatened by a nuclear 
power.82  It is within these regional and global dynamics and conflicts that determined 
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III. NIXON’S WHITE HOUSE AND THE SHAH OF IRAN 
 When Richard M. Nixon took office in 1969, one of his initial tasks involved 
reshaping America’s foreign policy.  Long weary of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, 
and deeply involved in the civil rights movement on the home front, the American public 
paid little attention to the events unfolding in the Middle East.  Yet the region remained 
crucial to U.S. security in maintaining the flow of oil to the West and in countering 
Soviet expansionism.  The Twin Pillars Policy, initiated by the Johnson administration in 
anticipation of Britain’s withdrawal from the region, devolved U.S. security in the 
Persian Gulf to Saudi Arabia and Iran in an attempt to contain the spread of 
communism.83  Recognizing American sentiment on U.S. overinvolvement on the world 
stage, Nixon discussed his rapidly evolving foreign policy approach with reporters on 
July 25, 1969, in Guam.  Initially labeled the Guam Doctrine, but later called the Nixon 
Doctrine, his remarks signified the role the U.S. would play in the post-Vietnam future.  
Nixon stated, among other key points, the U.S. would honor all its treaty commitments, 
and “that as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major 
power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a 
right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the 
83 Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, Shah, 29. 
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Asian nations themselves.”84  Although Nixon’s remarks concerned Asia, they quickly 
formed the basis of his overall foreign policy, which extended to the Persian Gulf. 
Under the Twin Pillars Policy, both Saudi Arabia and Iran stood as the regional 
guardians of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.  Nixon, preoccupied with Vietnam and 
U.S.-Soviet relations, nevertheless aspired to counter Soviet advances in the Middle East 
with improved relations with Arab states.  Neither Nixon, nor his National Security 
Adviser, Henry Kissinger, possessed much understanding of the Middle East, especially 
in the diplomatic methods employed in the region.85  The United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 242, unanimously approved on November 22, 1967, which affirmed 
the fulfilment of Charter principles requiring the establishment of a just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East,86 held little importance to either Nixon or Kissinger.  In his memoir, 
White House Years, Kissinger asserted, “When I entered office I knew little of the Middle 
East.”87  He went on to claim that Nixon felt Middle East diplomacy had no appeal 
domestically and possessed limited potential for any type of success.88  Although Nixon 
planned to guide foreign policy from the White House, and wanted a U.S. presence in the 
region mainly to thwart further Soviet influence, he desired to distance himself from 
directing Middle East policy.  As such, Nixon delegated the State Department to manage 
the region.89  With continuous, and increasing, tensions engulfing the Middle East, 
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Kissinger took on a much larger role and supplanted the State Department in handling 
Middle Eastern affairs. 
Nixon and Kissinger resonated intellectually.  In choosing Kissinger, Nixon later 
expressed in his memoir, “we were very much alike in our general outlook in that we 
shared a belief in the importance of isolating and influencing the factors affecting 
worldwide balances of power.”90  Since Nixon wanted a direct hand in guiding foreign 
policy, his choice of National Security Advisor was crucial.  As chair, Kissinger 
revamped the National Security Council (NSC), which then yielded him considerable 
power and effectively allowed him to skirt both the State Department and Congress in 
foreign policy matters.91  Even though the Middle East continued under the purview of 
the State Department, Kissinger crafted secret channels, “back channels” as he called 
them, to foreign governments and U.S. ambassadors.92  The furtive conduits, approved by 
Nixon, characterized the general manner in which Kissinger carried out much of his 
foreign policy processes and decision making.  
Appreciative of Israel’s position and role of countering communism in the Middle 
East, Nixon initially endeavored to employ a more evenhanded approach to the region 
with improved U.S.-Arab relations to balance the pro-Israel strategy of his 
predecessors.93  Although Nixon aimed to improve relations with Arab states, he skirted 
direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.94  As for Saudi Arabia, the government 
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looked with caution to their new role as part of the twin pillars, as they seldom made 
public stands on issues pertaining to matters outside of its borders.95  On the other side of 
the Gulf, the Shah of Iran relished his U.S. appointed position of importance.  Long wary 
of British imperialism in the region, Mohammad Reza feared that Britain’s pull out from 
the region would favor an Arab state, such as Iraq, as their replacement, and place Iran at 
greater risk to Soviet encroachment.  The Shah also desired to reestablish Iran among the 
great world powers, a position he felt the country once occupied.96  America’s move to 
position Iran as the other column supporting U.S. regional matters offered reassurance to 
Mohammad Reza, and provided the opportunity for him to champion his overarching 
agenda.  While enjoying diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab state, and Iran, 
a Shi’a non-Arab country, held differing worldviews, particularly in modernization, 
which made for uneasy cooperation as twin pillars of America’s new Middle Eastern 
policy.97  With progressively intense lobbying by the Shah, the Nixon administration 
increasingly relied on Iran to deliver regional stability, along with an orderly, continuous 
stream of oil to the United States and its allies.  This reliance on Iran to provide security 
in the Persian Gulf on behalf of the U.S. emboldened the Shah to assert his claim of 
regional dominance, initiate a challenge to Iraq over the Shatt al-ʿArab, and instigate a 
proxy war using the Iraqi Kurds as strategic allies. 
THE SHAH OF IRAN 
The warm association between Richard Nixon and the Shah of Iran began in 
1953.  While serving as vice president under Eisenhower, the two met for the first time.  
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During the encounter, Nixon observed him to be quiet and thoughtful, and later remarked, 
“I sensed an inner strength in him, and I felt that in the years ahead he would become a 
strong leader.”98  As president, Nixon found a matured Mohammad Reza with more self-
assurance and political astuteness, and a kindred spirit.  They both held adamant anti-
communist views, professed to be practitioners of realpolitik, and scorned American 
liberal intellectuals.99  The rapport the two shared allowed for greater ease in 
implementing Nixon’s doctrine in the Gulf region.  Apportioning regional responsibility 
to the Shah in curbing communism, the U.S. provided assistance and training to the 
Iranian government while interfering little with how they solved their internal communist 
problem.100  Mohammad Reza seized the opportunity afforded by the White House and 
amplified his lobbying for additional oil sales to the U.S. in exchange for increased 
purchasing of American weapons to defend the Gulf from Soviet incursion.101  Iran 
appeared poised to transform into a regional superpower. 
REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ AND THE IRAQI KURDS 
In 1968, Iran’s adversary to the west, Iraq, endured yet another regime change 
that brought the Baʿthists to power.  The previous Iraqi regime of ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿArif 
severed ties with the U.S. in 1967 after the Six Day War, although back channels existed 
between the United States and Iraq through foreign intermediaries.102  Shortly after 
Nixon took office, Iraq’s new regime, under the Baʿthists leader Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, 
sentenced and hanged sixteen people accused of spying for Israeli.103  The Iraqi move 
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aroused worldwide attention, including an attempted intervention by the U.S. through 
oversea emissaries, and a U.S. initiated appeal from the United Nations, but al-Bakr 
insisted the matter involved a domestic issue and that foreign entities needed to stay out 
of Iraq’s internal affairs.104  Additionally, in June 1969, the Iraqi regime signed an 
agreement with the Soviet Union to develop the Rumaila oilfield, a move that 
significantly brought the Soviets into the production of Gulf petroleum, and invited closer 
ties between Iraq and the Soviet Union.105  Increasingly isolated internationally, and 
tenuously governing domestically amid their ongoing consolidation of power, the 
Baʿthists, nonetheless, maintained a belligerent anti-Western stance and continued the 
call for armed struggle against Israel’s occupation of Arab territory.106  Iraq’s actions 
garnered little attention from the White House, which contented itself with the State 
Department and Iran dealing with the Iraqi issue.  
Al-Bakr’s regime experienced rising trepidation with the growing alliance 
between Iran and the U.S., and markedly so when American arm imports increased to 
Iran after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine.  Although its neighbor to the east 
caused major concern, the Kurdish question within Iraq presented just as large a problem.  
The Iraqi Kurds’ quest for autonomy posed a major obstacle to the Baʿth’s consolidation 
of power, particularly in light of Barzani and his Peshmerga (Kurdish fighting force, 
meaning “one who faces death”)107 proving over the years they could be a major source 
of disruption to the various ruling governments in Iraq.  After Barzani’s forces attacked 
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the oilfields in Kirkuk in March 1969, and disrupted oil flow for a number of days, al-
Bakr’s government looked to defuse Kurdish aims and bring the KDP into the Iraqi body 
politic.108  Long aware of both Iranian and Israeli support to the KDP, and hoping to 
counteract the two countries’ influences, al-Bakr dispatched Saddam Hussein, then 
second in command, to broker a deal with Barzani to appease the Kurds.109  Before 
Saddam could negotiate a settlement with Barzani, the Shah of Iran publically abrogated 
the 1937 treaty over the Shatt al-ʿArab in April 1969. 
The Shatt al-ʿArab (River of the Arabs, in Arabic) is formed by the confluence of 
the Euphrates and the Tigris in southern Iraq and empties into the Persian Gulf.  Its 
southern end delineates the boundary between Iran and Iraq.  Historically, the use of the 
river as a demarcation line presented a number of difficulties mainly due to the use of the 
thalweg principle previously mentioned.  The signed 1937 treaty recognized the border 
between the two countries using both the low water mark on the eastern side of the river 
and the thalweg between Abadan and Khorramshahr, approximately a four mile stretch of 
the Shatt al-ʿArab.110  This delineation proved advantageous to Iraq as the treaty gave 
control of most of the river to the Iraqis.  After arguing successfully of its nearly 
landlocked geography, and heavily supported by the British as a former mandate, the 
treaty granted Iraq concessions that allowed for the eventuality of Iran paying tolls to Iraq 
when Iranian ships used the Shatt al-ʿArab.111  In addition, stipulations of lowering the 
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Iranian flag and requiring an Iraqi pilot on Iranian ships contributed to the escalating 
tensions between the two countries after the 1937 treaty signing.112 
Since 1963, four years after Barzani initially reached out to Israel for assistance 
against their common foe, Iraq, the Israeli government provided weapons and 
ammunition to the KDP in support of their quest for an independent Iraqi Kurdistan.113  
Israel’s motive for helping the Kurds centered on unbalancing the then Iraqi regime, and 
not particularly on backing Iraqi Kurdish autonomy.  The Israeli government feared 
growing Iraqi Arab nationalism, and with Iran’s secret assistance, agreed to send Soviet-
made weapons, medical supplies, and communication equipment to the Iraqi Kurds’ 
nationalist movement, along with a $50,000 monthly stipend, which Iran supplemented 
with additional monetary and material support.114  Both governments agreed to keep the 
knowledge of the covert arrangements from their allies.  While the Israeli-Iranian backing 
allowed Barzani and the KDP to make several significant military strikes and raids 
against the Iraqi central governments, the Kurds were unable to turn the joint support into 
creditable advancements toward autonomy.  The Iraqi Kurds were able, however, to 
diffuse Iraq’s strength in the region by preoccupying and subverting the Baʿthist regime’s 
internal efforts to consolidate their base of power. 
Viewing the Iraqi Baʿthists’ socialist rhetoric and growing relationship with the 
Soviets as disturbing, and a potential threat to his sovereignty, the Shah felt emboldened 
by the Twin Pillars Policy to assert his regional dominance against al-Bakr’s regime.  
With the looming 1971 British withdrawal from the region, the Shah endeavored to prove 
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his significance in the Gulf to the U.S. by manufacturing a crisis along the Shatt al-ʿArab 
waterway, thereby demonstrating his assumed provincial authority and ability to check 
Iraq’s army.  The Shah announced Iran would make full use of the Shatt al-ʿArab without 
respect to Iraqi territorial rights, established under the 1937 Saadabad Pact, and amassed 
troops along various disputed southern border points.115  He hoped to diminish the 
Baʿthist regime’s effectiveness by splitting Iraqi forces between fighting the Kurds in the 
north and defending Iraqi territorial rights on the Shatt al-ʿArab.116  Iraq retaliated against 
the move by threatening to use force to defend its claim of the waterway.  For its part, the 
U.S. State Department continued its hands-off policy towards Iraq and dismissed Iranian 
claims of al-Bakr’s regime becoming a communist satellite of the Soviet Union.117  The 
evidence gathered by the State Department indicated that the Baʿth regime, contrary to 
Iranian assertions, continued in its internal struggle with the Iraqi Communist Party 
(ICP), and in fact, worked to severely limit, if not eliminate, ICP involvement in Iraq’s 
central government.118  As such, the White House deferred to the State Department’s 
position and allowed the status quo to stand. 
With fighting Barzani’s Peshmerga in the north, and Iran contesting the Shatt al-
ʿArab, al-Bakr and his second in command needed time to secure their base of power.  In 
order to placate the Kurds and stop the open hostilities, along with countering the Shah’s 
support of the KDP, Saddam traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to work out a deal with Barzani.  
On March 11, 1970, both camps signed and initiated an agreement that recognized, 
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among other items, the Iraqi Kurds’ right to territorial autonomy.119  As noted by Ofra 
Bengio and David McDowall, the declaration marked, for the first time in the twentieth 
century, an Iraqi regime recognizing Kurdish rights to territorial autonomy.120  McDowall 
also stated that the accord has endured as “the Kurds’ favoured foundation stone for 
future relations with the rest of Iraq.”121  For the Baʿth regime, the agreement provided 
both time for centralizing their control and relief from the armed struggle with the KDP.  
In addition to signing the declaration, Barzani broke his ties with Iran.122  These 
combined actions shifted the regional dynamics between Iraq and Iran as the agreement 
allowed for the reallocating of Iraqi troops from the provinces in the north to the 
contested regions along the Shatt al-ʿArab. 
THE 1970 MARCH ACCORD 
The March accord angered the Shah of Iran, who had previously sent word to 
Baghdad that he would cease supplying the KDP in return for Iraqi concessions in the 
Shatt al-ʿArab, which al-Bakr declined.123  Significantly, the mutual agreement between 
the Baʿthist regime and the KDP meant the Shah lost a critical advantage, the Iraqi 
Kurds’ belligerence against Baghdad, in his scheme to assert Iran’s regional authority.  
The Shah then intensified his appeal to the U.S. for greater support, particularly in 
helping “to equip and develop its forces so that minimum necessary deterrent strength 
could be developed prior to British pull-out from Gulf end of 1971.”124  He was 
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convinced the Soviets initiated the declaration with the ultimate goal of establishing an 
independent Kurdish state, thereby creating a conduit bypassing Iran and Turkey and 
permitting easier Soviet access to the Middle East.125   Over the following two months, 
the Shah sent numerous communications to the State Department via direct talks with 
various U.S. embassy and military officials, as well as messages sent by him through his 
prime minister, making multiple requests for increased resources to defend the Persian 
Gulf from Soviet encroachment.126  At this juncture, the State Department continued the 
lead in handling Middle Eastern affairs.  Skeptical of the Shah’s warnings, the State 
Department declined to take any explicit action, and expressed to Tehran that the 
declaration between the Baʿthist regime and the Iraqi Kurds would likely fall apart as the 
two camps held a mutual distrust of the other.127  Although Kissinger received briefings 
and reports on the region, and generated memorandums to keep the president briefed on 
situations, Persian Gulf issues remained a low priority. 
Throughout the remainder of 1970, and during 1971, the relationship between the 
Baʿthists and the Iraqi Kurds stayed cautious.  In July 1970, the Baʿth rejected the KDP’s 
nomination of Habib Karim as Vice President of the Republic because he was of Persian 
ancestry.128  Article twelve of the March accord stipulated that one of the vice presidents 
would be a Kurd.129  The refusal of Karim elicited no negative response from Barzani, 
but the move indicated that each side continued to be wary of the other.  Another article 
125 Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, Shah, 75. 
126 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-
1972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2006), Chapter 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/ch2 (accessed April 7, 
2018). 
127 Gibson, Sold Out? 118. 
128 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq 1958, 143. 
129 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 328. 
44 
 
                                                 
in the agreement called for the “unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-
governing unit.”130  In order to determine the demarcation of the autonomous region, 
Baghdad called for a census to take place in October 1970.131  The region of Kirkuk, an 
oil-rich province, presented a sticking point for both sides.  Baghdad feared the census 
would prove the area’s population majority Kurdish, thus requiring Kirkuk be turned over 
to the Iraqi Kurds.132  Barzani worried the census would be manipulated by the regime, 
either by forging results or by relocating the inhabitants to change the population 
statistics.133  Each side, leery of the other’s motives, maneuvered to present their case.  
Barzani attempted to bring in under his control the Turkomans in Kirkuk, whom the 
Turkoman leader claimed were threatened with elimination if they did not comply with 
Kurdish demands, thereby asserting the Turkoman as Kurdish.134  Another argument 
attempted by Barzani entailed including the Faili Kurds, originally from Luristan, Iran, as 
citizens, and therefore counting them in the census as Kurdish.135  The Baʿth regime, for 
their part, reinstituted and propagated an Arabization policy in the Kirkuk region 
whereby they evacuated Kurds and settled Arabs.136    Coupled with a failed assassination 
attempt of Barzani’s son, Idris, as well as Barzani himself, the March declaration showed 
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BREAKING OF RELATIONS 
Iranian-Iraqi relations devolved, on November 30, 1971, Iran seized three islands 
in the Strait of Hormuz.137  One day later, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Iran, as 
well as broke off ties to Great Britain.  After unsuccessfully attempting to rally other 
Arab nations against Iran’s growing power in the Gulf, and Britain’s quiet consent of 
Iran’s increasing military build-up, Iraq turned towards rapprochement with the 
Soviets.138  The signing of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, in 
April 1972, coupled with the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company two months 
later, enabled al-Bakr and Saddam to gain considerable control of the central 
government.139  Whereas the 1970 March accord sought to align the Kurds with the Baʿth 
regime, the new treaty forsook the Iraqi Kurds in favor of the ICP, which stood as an 
obstacles to the Baʿth’s consolidation of power, too.  While Barzani had previously asked 
the Soviets to be included in the Soviet-Iraqi pact, the signed agreement left the Kurds 
out altogether with only a promise by the Soviet premier that he would take up the matter 
with Baghdad.140  Moscow neglected to make good on their word. 
The earlier assassination attempts on Barzani and his son led the KDP leader to 
renew his association with both Iran and Israel.  As the Soviets had pressured him to 
acquiesce to Baghdad, Barzani felt increasingly constrained in his ability to counteract 
the Baʿth and to assert for Iraqi Kurdish autonomy.  One of the stipulations of the Soviet-
Iraqi treaty involved including the Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi communists into the National 
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Patriotic Front with the Baʿth in hopes of stabilizing Iraq internally.141  Now heavily 
invested in Iraq, the Soviet Union wanted a calm domestic scene to insure the usefulness 
and longevity of their alliance.  The Soviets courted Barzani with guarantees of support 
for autonomy if the Iraqi Kurds aligned with the Baʿthist regime.  Distrusting of the 
Soviets, Barzani then sent urgent messages to Washington.  The warning to the 
administration was intervene with support or the Kurds would be forced to join with the 
Iraqi regime.  Barzani made several appeals through various indirect channels, such as 
via SAVAK (Iran’s Organization of National Security and Information) officials, a KDP 
emissary to U.S. Embassy representatives, and a direct request from King Hussein of 
Jordan, but his appeals for direct U.S. financial assistance went unheeded.142  
Washington’s preoccupation with final preparations for the upcoming Moscow Summit, 
along with recommendations from the NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs) and the 
CIA, precluded any changes.143  The Nixon administration maintained its nonintervention 
policy towards the Iraqi Kurds as the U.S. had no strategic interest in their nationalist 
movement.  Although the Soviet-Iraqi treaty caused concern in the White House, Nixon 
remained focused on achieving détente with the Soviet Union and preferred to make no 
policy changes that could be construed as anti-Soviet.144  Nixon chose, instead, to let Iran 
and Israel handle the Kurds. 
As the Moscow Summit engrossed the White House, Barzani and SAVAK 
devised a plan to overthrow the Baʿth regime using an alliance of Iraqi opposition forces 
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operating out of Iraqi Kurdistan.145  The KDP, while receiving funding from Iran and 
Israel, remained in negotiations with Baghdad for the full implementation of the 1970 
March accord.  Barzani felt the unfulfilled articles in the accord, in particular the return 
of Kurds to their villages and redress of wrongful Arabization, equated to an all-out 
assault on the Iraqi Kurds.146  Untrusting of Tehran to fulfill its promises, and clearly at 
odds with Baghdad, Barzani pinned his hopes on Washington eventually coming through 
with support for Kurdish ambitions. 
After the success of the Moscow Summit, and no longer feeling the pre-talk 
constraints, the U.S. turned its attention towards re-evaluating its policy on Iraq.  The 
direct Soviet-Iraqi alliance changed the Cold War dynamics in the Gulf region.  As well, 
it highlighted Barzani’s arguments for the U.S. supporting the Iraqi Kurds.  Nixon, 
having previous experience dealing with Iraq in the late 1950s as Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s vice president, understood the Cold War significance of the treaty.147  The 
White House did not believe in the validity of the Iraqi Kurd’s struggle, and it harbored 
the fear that the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq would spread to its regional allies, Turkey and 
Iran.148  In agreement, the State Department warned that autonomy or independence for 
the Iraqi Kurds would prove regionally destabilizing and detrimental in the long term.149  
Kissinger often referred to the Iraqi Kurdish uprising as a ‘Kurdish thing’, but 
acknowledged in his concluding memoir, Years of Renewal, that after signing the treaty 
with the Soviet Union, “Iraqi forces stepped up their attacks on the Kurds beyond a level 
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that could be balanced by covert Iranian and Israeli assistance.”150  Indeed, not only had 
Iraqi aggression towards the Iraqi Kurds intensified, skirmishes between Iraq and Iran 
troops escalated along their common border.151  After Nixon and Kissinger’s scheduled 
trip to Tehran in late May 1972, the tides of fortune changed in favor of Barzani and the 
KDP. 
KISSINGER STEPS IN  
While in Iran, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah discussed several key issues 
relating to current events, from the Moscow Summit to Iran’s help in South Asia.  As 
recorded in the official memorandum of conversation, both leaders reiterated their 
appreciation of solid U.S.-Iranian relations; Nixon added, “We came to visit Iran because 
we considered it symbolic of our strong support for our friends.  We would not let down 
our friends.”152  For his part, the Shah stressed the importance of the Middle East to the 
West, especially in regards to the flow of oil to the United States and its allies, and the 
threat posed by the Soviet-Iraqi treaty to Iran’s security.153  He also restated his fear that 
“the Soviets would establish a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists; 
the Kurdish problem instead of being a thorn in the side could become an asset to the 
Communists.”154  When asked by Kissinger what the U.S. could do, the Shah replied that 
Turkey needed strengthening, and “Iran can help with the Kurds.”155  Kissinger later 
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reported, in his third memoir, that after the meeting with the Shah, Nixon felt the Iraqi 
Kurdish rebellion against the Baʿthist regime would fall apart without America’s help.156  
Furthermore, Kissinger remarked that the intent of American sponsorship centered on 
penalizing Iraq for “imposing their regime,” and the U.S. contributing to the regional 
balance of power.157  The support would grant the Kurds increased bargaining power 
against the Iraqi regime, and bring about some cohesion to the sometimes conflicting 
reasons for Iranian and Israeli backing.158  The Tehran meeting prompted America’s first 
direct support of the Iraqi Kurds and their ambitions for self-governance.  In redefining 
U.S. security in the Persian Gulf, the Nixon administration persisted with the Cold War 
mindset of containing Soviet influence in the region.  Despite the success of the Moscow 
Summit, unresolved issues over conflicts in the Middle East perpetuated tensions 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.  By secretly funding the Iraqi Kurds, and 
ostensibly their goal of autonomy, the U.S. demonstrated a continued commitment to its 
Gulf policy of supporting regional states, principally Iran, in defending American 
interests in the region. 
Over the course of Nixon’s first two years in office, Kissinger appropriated a 
larger role in Middle East policy making.  Often circumventing the State Department’s 
authority and policies in the region, Kissinger utilized his well-developed network of 
back channels to accomplish his agenda.  An August 23, 1973, New York Times article, 
entitled “Rogers Quits, Kissinger Named,” claimed that Kissinger overshadowed William 
P. Rogers, Secretary of State, despite Rogers apparent role as Nixon’s top adviser on 





                                                 
foreign policy.159  Kissinger’s political prowess ostensibly overshadowed Rogers’ 
abilities.  A later New York Times article, “William P. Rogers, Who Served as Nixon’s 
Secretary of State, Is Dead at 87,” asserted that during Rogers’ tenure as Secretary of 
State, Kissinger secretly arranged the details of Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China 
(1972), as well as held talks with North Vietnam, all without the knowledge of Rogers.160  
Nixon and Kissinger frequently met several times a day when the National Security 
Advisor was in Washington.161  Consequently, Kissinger possessed greater access to the 
President along with more opportunities to argue for the legitimacies of his, Kissinger’s, 
proposals.  During the May 1972 meeting with the Shah, Kissinger asserted his perceived 
position and initiated the inquiry as how best the United States could help.  He eventually 
persuaded Nixon that a move to support the Iraqi Kurds was in the best interest of the 
United States.  Kissinger played the pivotal role in the covert financing of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement from the onset of U.S. involvement. 
U.S. COVERT SUPPORT TO IRAQI KURDS  
 Against the backdrop of Cold War concerns and the prospect of a secret alliance 
between the U.S. and the Iraqi Kurds, the Shah of Iran made a request through Richard 
Helms, Director of the CIA, that a meeting be arranged between Kissinger and two KDP 
diplomats, Idris Barzani and Mahmoud Uthman.162  In June 1972, the Kurds presented 
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their case directly to key U.S. officials.  Although not present, Kissinger authorized 
Helms and Colonel Richard Kennedy, Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Council Planning, to communicate U.S. sympathy for the Iraqi Kurdish 
movement and acknowledge their presence in Helms’ office proved America’s 
consideration of their request.163  After the meeting, Helms sent a proposal, dated July 28, 
to the White House advocating for covert support to the Iraqi Kurds.  The CIA’s 
recommendation, prompted by Kissinger, included two means by which military and 
financial assistance could be ordered, either by circumventing the 40 Committee and go 
straight by memorandum to the President, or inform the 40 Committee principles, 
avoiding any paper, and informing them that the President wants this done.164  A division 
of the Executive branch, the 40 Committee’s mandate specified overseeing proposed 
significant covert activity.  Nixon directed Kissinger to gain approval without meeting on 
the subject.  Citing reasons of security, Kissinger asserted that the plan was hand-carried 
to the principles with each having the opportunity to object, but none did.165  Immediately 
after the consent of the committee principles, shipments of arms and supplies began, 
funneled through Iran to the Iraqi Kurds.  Not until August 1, 1972, did Nixon sign off on 
the directive, which included $3 million in financial assistance per year and another $2 
million for military supplies.166  For the first time, the United States categorically 
intervened on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds’ objectives. 
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 Throughout the remainder of 1972, and well into 1973, skirmishes intensified 
between Kurdish and government forces despite on-going negotiations between Barzani 
and the Iraqi regime.  The proposed geographic boundaries of the Kurdish autonomous 
region constituted the main sticking point.167  The additional covert support from the U.S. 
appeared to give the Iraqi Kurds the needed leverage to maintain their ground politically 
and geographically.  With increasing American support, the KDP felt emboldened to 
resist joining the National Patriotic Front and empowered to push for autonomy.  
According to a December 1, 1972, air gram from the Interests Section in Baghdad to the 
Department of State, Arthur L. Lowrie, Principle Officer, reported that although the 
Baʿthist regime realized a degree of stability, the Kurds continued as the only organized 
opposition and were in physical control of a considerable portion of territory along the 
Iranian border.168  In a March 29, 1973, memorandum, Kissinger informed Nixon that 
Barzani was the strongest he had ever been during the past twelve years of struggle.  
Kissinger further stated about Barzani afforded a buffer force against subversive Iraqi 
infiltration teams, and occupied a considerable number of Iraqi forces in the north thereby 
preventing them from offensive adventures elsewhere.169  American covert backing 
seemed to be working in favor of both the U.S. and the Iraqi Kurds. 
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The outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, however, complicated the 
relationship between the United States and the Iraqi Kurds.  When the Soviet Union 
declined to include Iraq in pre-war consultations, Baghdad, detecting a definite slight, 
undertook efforts to improve its associations with the West.170  As U.S.-Iraqi relations 
advanced with more Iraqi contracts awarded to U.S. companies, Kissinger, who 
subverted the State Department and took on a disproportionately larger role in Middle 
Eastern affairs, used his network of back channels to devise a plan to draw Iraq’s 
attention away from the 1973 war by escalating the Iranian-Iraqi conflict.171  The means 
by which Kissinger undertook to accomplish the scheme involved having the Shah 
instigate further troubles in Kurdistan.172  While skirmishes continued between Iraqi and 
Kurdish forces, Baghdad hoped to fend off a protracted war with the Kurds.  In 
December 1973, the Baʿthist regime offered a revised autonomy plan to Barzani.173  
During the following three months, Kurdish subversive activity subsided as Barzani and 
Saddam worked together to arrive at a mutual accord, but to no avail.  On March 11, 
1974, Saddam presented the Autonomy Law to the Iraqi Kurds, which included articles 
Barzani felt controversial, and gave Barzani two weeks to accept the plan.174  The main 
point of contention continued to revolve around demarcation lines, particularly the oil-
rich region of Kirkuk.  In addition, disagreements over the structure of financial 
autonomy, whether the budget for the autonomous region would reside independently or 
operate as part of the overall Iraqi budget; the formation and authority of the legislative 
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council in the autonomous region; the subjection of regional security to the state; and, the 
supervision by the state on the legality of decisions made by the autonomous bodies.175  
After requesting more funding and advanced military weaponry from the U.S., in which 
Kissinger spearheaded the White House’s consent to a modest increase, Barzani declined 
Baghdad’s autonomy proposal.176  Emboldened by U.S. and Iranian support, Barzani 
pressed forward with his agenda of establishing an autonomous government in the 
Kurdistan region. 
FIFTH KURDISH WAR 
The Iraqi-Kurdish cease-fire while negotiating the Autonomy Law did not last, 
and in April 1974, the fifth Kurdish war broke out.177  America’s objective in supporting 
the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement, principally orchestrated by Kissinger, centered 
on backing the Shah of Iran as primary U.S. protectorate in the Gulf.  In view of the 
vacuum left by the December 1971 British withdrawal from the region, the U.S. turned to 
the Shah to maintain security and stability in the area.  Cold War concerns dominated 
when the Soviet Union entered into a treaty with Iraq, Iran’s biggest regional rival.  In 
support of Iran and in opposition to Soviet encroachment, the United States provided 
secret aid to the Iraqi Kurds in an effort to destabilize the Ba’thist regime in Iraq.  
Kissinger figured prominently in the covert funding of the nationalist movement that 
ultimately proved detrimental to the Kurdish rebellion.  Circumventing the State 
Department to avoid scrutiny of his plans, Kissinger dealt directly with Helms, at the 
CIA, to assure covert support to the Iraqi Kurds, with the overall mission to sustain the 
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Shah’s regional position of power.  In the interest of U.S.-Iranian relations, Kissinger 
prompted the first direct contact between the KDP and the White House, which resulted 
in direct financial and military support to the Iraqi Kurds delivered through Iran.  While 
autonomy negotiations between Baghdad and the KDP continued, Kissinger used his 
considerable authority to subvert the State Department’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle 
East and to increase U.S. support in favor of the Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist movement.  With 
the signing of the Algiers Accord and the aftermath that followed, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, the Iraqi Kurds lost all financial support, and ultimately the 
1974 rebellion against Iraq.  Precipitated by Kissinger’s decision to withdraw aid to the 



















IV. THE ALGIERS ACCORD AFTERMATH 
Henry Kissinger orchestrated covert support to the Iraqi Kurds in an effort to 
further America’s agenda of assuring Iran’s status as a U.S. protectorate in the Persian 
Gulf.  Iran persisted as a firm ally, but the U.S. risked alienating Tehran if the Shah’s 
request to aid the KDP went unmet.  By granting assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, Kissinger 
all but guaranteed Iran’s position as a key U.S. ally.  Cold War concerns also factored 
into Kissinger’s calculations.  By keeping Iran closely aligned with America, the 
likelihood of Tehran tilting towards the Soviet Union remained minimal.  Kissinger 
secretly supplying the Iraqi Kurds benefited both the U.S. and Iran, while appearing to 
support Iraqi Kurdish aims for autonomy. 
Kissinger seized every opportunity available to him to secure Iran’s position in 
the Gulf, and capitalized on many of his foreign policy successes, such as the Moscow 
Summit, the May 1972 Tehran meeting, and Nixon’s official 1972 China visit, which 
Kissinger secretly arranged, to further imbed himself in foreign policy making.  Those 
accomplishments enhanced Kissinger’s status with the president, and after Rogers’ 
resignation, Nixon appointed Kissinger to the secretary position in September 1973.  As 
previously mentioned, Rogers often felt obstructed in his duties by the National Security 
Advisor.178  The tension between Rogers and Kissinger had grown increasingly 
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acrimonious throughout the first four years of the Nixon administration as the National 
Security Advisor leveraged his back channel connections to the Iraqi Kurds, bypassed the 
State Department in communications and notifications, and assumed greater authority in 
developing and implementing Middle East foreign policy.  The covert support to the Iraqi 
Kurds exemplified one of Kissinger’s many back channel maneuverings.  Another 
example of Kissinger’s operational methods entailed embarking on what the press 
dubbed “shuttle diplomacy” in which he assisted with negotiations between Middle 
Eastern leaders in troop withdraws and other diplomatic details resulting from the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War.179  Cold War concerns and maintaining open channels for the flow of 
oil figured prominently in Kissinger’s Middle East policy calculations.  Providing aid to 
the Iraqi Kurds nicely fit into Kissinger’s strategy of maintaining Tehran as an ally and 
keeping Iran’s foe, Iraq, off balance. 
FORD ASSUMES PRESIDENCY  
Watergate, a political scandal involving the president, precipitated Nixon’s 
resignation in August 1974.  Gerald R. Ford assumed the presidency and maintained 
Henry Kissinger as both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State.  Ford, having 
limited experience with foreign affairs before taking over the presidency, and seeking to 
maintain the forward momentum already in progress, relied on Kissinger’s expertise to 
sustain the then current state of affairs.  Against the back drop of the Cold War and rising 
oil prices, Ford became the new commander-in-chief, but Kissinger managed foreign 
policy.  
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In his concluding volume of memoirs, Years of Renewal, Kissinger observed that 
not since Harry S. Truman had a president inherited such an array of foreign policy 
challenges in his first weeks in office than Ford.180  During the same period, Congress 
exercised increasing oversight, and as time passed, legislated more specific foreign 
policies than during Nixon’s time in office.181  Kissinger’s dual positions, however, 
allowed him to continue wielding considerable influence in foreign policy making.  He 
maintained his firm commitment of covert support to the Iraqi Kurds, and apprised Ford 
on a “need to know” basis.182  Kissinger enjoyed a good working relationship with Ford, 
however, he withheld information from the new president that would hamper Kissinger’s 
overall agenda in the Persian Gulf, which sought to maintain Iran’s regional supremacy.  
The secret plan of supplying Barzani and his Peshmerga conformed to the strategy of 
assigning regional countries as proxies in the fight against the Soviets.  Although Ford 
continued American arms sales to Iran and U.S. covert backing of the Iraqi Kurds, he 
took a more cautious stance on new undertakings with the Shah.  Ford considered and 
weighed arguments made by members of his administration and those in Congress who 
leveled criticisms against the Iranian leader before making decisions.183  As president, 
Ford had the final authority, but Kissinger managed to sway policy to affect the outcomes 
he hoped to achieve, which involved supplanting direct U.S. military forces in the Gulf 
region with regional allies. 
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OIL PRICES AND EMBARGO 
The continuing rise of oil prices, provided Iran and Iraq with growing revenues, 
which they then poured into additional weapon acquisitions.184  Between 1967 and 1973, 
U.S. natural gas reserves significantly dropped from a fifteen year supply to that of less 
than ten years, which in turn, hastened an increase in oil imports to make up for the 
shortfalls.185  During the same period, American oil well drilling precipitously fell as 
environmental legislation severely hampered those operations.186  To compensate for the 
shortages, the U.S. increased oil purchases from countries that also constituted the main 
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in 
1960.187  After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, some members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, 
instituted an oil embargo against the U.S. and other Western nations for their support of 
Israel.188  Both Iran and Iraq formed a part of OPEC.  One of the outcomes of the 
embargo resulted in massive price hikes for petroleum, which negatively impacted the 
economies of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.189  For the U.S., the 
embargo also highlighted the importance of oil to national security and the necessity of 
maintaining good relations with OPEC countries to assure American access to oil.  For 
several of the OPEC nations, the rise in oil prices provided an increasing stream of 
revenue.   
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As part of his shuttle diplomacy, in November 1973, Kissinger met with the Shah 
of Iran in Tehran to discuss the state of Middle Eastern affairs and the implications of the 
oil embargo.190  During the meeting, the Shah agreed not to join the embargo, and 
additionally offered to mediate with two other OPEC member countries, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, to end the energy crisis.191  The meeting ensured a continuation of strong ties 
between the U.S. and Iran, particularly in light of the negative impact the Watergate 
scandal had on America’s prestige worldwide.  The rise of oil prices also benefited Iraq, 
which spent its revenues on growing its military capabilities.  Viewed through the lens of 
the Cold War conflict, the increasing strengthen of Iraq’s military led to worrying 
regional ramifications that solidified the importance U.S.-Iranian ties.   
  Although Ford held a guarded view of the Shah, overall U.S.-Iranian relations 
remained virtually unaffected by the change in administrations, largely due to Kissinger’s 
continued dual governmental roles.  The Shah continued to act as both a conduit and 
supplier of military weapons to the Iraqi Kurds, mainly financed through oil profits, for 
the overall purpose of keeping Iraq off balance and the Soviets at bay.  The Shah’s 
strategy overlapped with America’s over all Cold War plans in the Gulf region.  
According to Kissinger, the United States sought to provide the Kurds with the ability to 
continue negotiating with Baghdad for Kurdish recognition, and keep Iraq unbalanced 
without irrevocably dividing up the country.192  Iran’s goal also included wanting Iraqi 
concessions concerning the Shatt al-ʿArab, as well as a sustained Iranian presence in Iraqi 
Kurdistan by means of Barzani and his Peshmerga.  The Shah feared that if Barzani were 
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defeated, Tehran would lose leverage over Baghdad.  In addition, Tehran feared that the 
resulting power vacuum in the Kurdish region might lead to Soviet-backed Iraqi 
communists taking over the area, an immediate threat to Iran.193  As the Iraqi military 
made significant advances into Kurdish territory in late summer 1974, holding more 
ground than it had at any time since 1961, Iran and Israel pressed the U.S. to supply 
heavier artillery to the Iraqi Kurds.194  Barzani also made separate appeals to the U.S. for 
increased assistance.  Kissinger agreed that the Peshmerga needed advanced weaponry to 
hold their positions and ward off further losses, but concerns over how to pay and deliver 
the additional heavy artillery and tanks without revealing U.S. clandestine funding 
proved formidable.195  Already, the United States contributed a little more than $8 
million a year in covert Kurdish support.196 
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TO IRAQI KURDS   
Originally, the Shah indicated he might dispatch regular troops to assist the Iraqi 
Kurds, supplementing existing Iranian auxiliary troops dressed as Kurdish Peshmerga.197  
The Iranians deployed to Iraqi Kurdistan two artillery battalions, several mortar platoons 
and air defense batteries, and surface-to-air missile units.198   But that stratagem, 
Kissinger asserted, held additional complications, such as being too open-ended and too 
hazardous, which he expressed directly to Ford when briefing the new president on the 
Kurdish operation.199  Instead, Kissinger suggested another proposition, to which Ford 
agreed, that entailed arrangements the Secretary of State devised with Israel to provide 
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the Iraqi Kurds with $20 million in Soviet weapons captured by the Israelis during the 
1973 war.200  The additional weaponry allowed the Iraqi Kurds to maintain their defenses 
and buy more time to resupply for the upcoming winter.  As well, the delivery of heavy 
weapons benefited the Shah by keeping Barzani and his Peshmerga militarily viable, thus 
sidestepping a direct war with Iraq.201  Kissinger’s plan fulfilled the goals of both the 
U.S. and Iran without divulging America’s covert interests in the region. 
IRAQ LAUNCHES MAJOR OFFENSIVE 
Initially, the Iraqi Kurds achieved a degree of success in the first month of the 
war.  They employed guerilla tactics to besiege multiple garrisons, and routed supply 
lines to 12,000 Iraqi troops positioned at critical defensive locations.202  In a crucial 
move, the KDP captured the town of Rawandiz, an Iraqi army controlled city on a critical 
route leading to Iran for the Kurds.203  Barzani and his Peshmerga appeared to be 
succeeding in their war efforts, and claimed to have the backing of the Kurdish 
population, as evidenced by tens of thousands of people leaving towns and villages for 
liberated Kurdish areas.204  In late spring, however, Baghdad launched a major offensive, 
aided by the Soviets.  Unlike any previous onslaught in the past, these new military 
assaults involved indiscriminate aerial bombings of Kurdish civilian populations.205  
Having taken advantage of increased oil revenues to purchase more military hardware 
from the Soviets, the Iraqi military unleased an attack against the Iraqi Kurds.206  In 
breach of the Geneva Convention, the Iraqi air force also dropped napalm bombs and 
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phosphorous chemicals, obtained from the Soviet Union, on Kurdish villages.207  Along 
with the bombing tactics, Iraq instituted an economic blockade in Kurdish areas outside 
of Iraqi control, and burned their agriculture fields and destroyed farm machinery.208  As 
well, Baghdad employed terror campaigns against the general Kurdish population and 
encouraged Arab families to move into abandoned Kurdish homes and villages.  The 
Baʿthist regime hoped to break the popularity of Barzani and the KDP, diminish the call 
for Kurdish autonomy, and gain support for the Iraqi central government.  Although 
Barzani and the nationalist movement enjoyed popular support, managing to continue 
attracting thousands of Kurdish volunteers from all over Iraq, an increasing number of 
Iraqi Kurdish refugees scrambled to the northern border and into Iran.209  The Peshmerga 
lost ground in late summer, but managed to fortify the remaining territory they held and 
dug in for the upcoming winter.     
The influx of over 100,000 Kurdish refugees into Iran, along with another 
400,000 amassed inside Iraq’s northern border, brought about by the Baʿth regime’s 
terror operations and the war, caused grave concern for both Barzani and the Shah.210  
The flood of Kurds into the region created a humanitarian crisis that overextended 
Barzani’s abilities to manage the situation and strained Iranian resources.211  As such, 
both leaders petitioned the U.S. for increased aid to deal with the disaster.  The Iraqi 
Kurdish situation looked ominous from a number of viewpoints.  Although Iran’s support 
to the Iraqi Kurds in the fall of 1974 reached a record level of $75 million a year, Barzani 
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needed additional assistance.212  Kissinger also worried that Iran’s increasing financial 
strain, largely due to supporting the Iraqi Kurds, would weaken the Shah’s defenses and 
place the country in a more vulnerable position against Iraq.  But, the prospect of 
revealing the covert activity and asking for additional funding from Congress presented 
Kissinger with a greater conundrum.213  Ford agreed to the Israeli-Kissinger scheme to 
provide heavy weapons to the Peshmerga even though Congress increasingly exercised 
oversight of the executive branch.  The Watergate scandal precipitated a leery attitude 
towards the presidency, and Congress reacted with growing review and monitoring of 
government agencies and policy implementations.  Keeping Kurdish covert support 
secret from Congress posed a substantial problem for Kissinger, who expressed that 
Congressional approval for added backing would surely be rejected.214  Nonetheless, 
jeopardizing the Iraqi Kurds’ position, and thus Iran, ruled out inaction.  As such, 
Kissinger worked in a back channel manner to keep Tehran supplied.  He also managed 
to push through the previous administration’s approved humanitarian aid and the Soviet 
weaponry transferred to the Iraqi Kurds, as Congress remained shielded from the 
process.215  Through Kissinger, U.S. Cold War policy in the Middle East continued along 
the same track as it had during Nixon’s administration with Iran serving as America’s 
Persian Gulf proxy. 
DEAL MAKING   
 While the Shah lobbied the U.S. for continued support to Barzani, he also 
explored the possibility of making a deal with the Baʿth regime.  When the Shatt al-ʿArab 
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dispute turned violent with open skirmishes between Iranian and Iraqi troops in February 
1974, Baghdad asked the United Nations to condemn Tehran for its aggressive actions.216  
After further investigations and in response, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 
348 (1974) that called for a resumption of talks between the two countries with “a view to 
a comprehensive settlement of all bilateral issues.”217  Although Tehran persisted with 
open hostilities against Baghdad, Iranian and Iraqi diplomats began meetings to work on 
resolving outstanding disputes as directed by the council.218  The Shah remained intent on 
moving Iran’s border on the Shatt al-ʿArab to the boundary prior to the 1937 treaty, as 
part of his campaign to enhance his dynasty’s image and elevate his stature at home.219  
Furthermore, he distrusted the Baʿth regime’s resolve to arrive at an agreement.  
Nonetheless, negotiations slowly continued between the two countries. 
 Prior to the start of the 1974 Kurdish War, Iraq began cultivating new economic 
and political avenues with the West.  In April 1974, the Baʿth regime renewed diplomatic 
ties with Great Britain, much to the surprise of the U.S. officials in Baghdad.220  The 
regime also opened relations with France and West Germany.221  Attempting to diminish 
the Soviet’s role in Iraq with leaked reports of discord between the two countries, 
Baghdad pushed towards rapprochement with pro-Western Arab nations, particularly 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt.222  Although the Soviet Union remained the main 
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supplier of arms to Iraq, and persisted in its involvement in Iraqi oil industries, Baghdad 
now possessed the financial means to expand beyond the Soviets.223   
In another unexpected move, Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Talib El-Shibib, 
signaled to U.S. Ambassador John Scali that the Iraqi regime wanted to enhance U.S.-
Iraqi relations.224  The opening signified the first time since 1967 that Iraq, on an official 
level, proposed improving U.S.-Iraqi relations.225  Scali relayed the message to Kissinger, 
who then asked the Ambassador to respond to El-Shibib with “Secretary welcomes Iraqi 
readiness to continue this dialogue which he feels will be useful to the interests of both 
our countries.”226  Kissinger also expressed interest in inviting El-Shibib to Washington, 
but without publicity so as to keep the meeting secret.227  While the overtures marked a 
willingness to improve U.S.-Iraqi relations, Kissinger maintained steadfast support of 
Iran and the Iraqi Kurds.  In June 1974, Iraq restored relations with the Soviet Union in 
order to secure more weaponry in its battle against the KDP, and for border protection 
against Iran.228  Nevertheless, back channel communications between the U.S. and Iraq 
persisted.229  Kissinger acknowledged the value of improving U.S.-Iraqi relations, but the 
precarious position of the Iraqi Kurds and the importance of keeping the KDP militarily 
viable outweighed the importance of developing deeper relations with the Baʿth regime.  
Maintaining the regional strength of Iran, and thus the continuing support to the Iraqi 
Kurds, remained Kissinger’s priority. 
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Amidst the various back channel discussions—including UN-directed talks 
between Iran and Iraq—the Shah began to express some doubt about the Iraqi Kurds’ 
military capabilities in fighting Iraqi forces.  In December 1974, the Shah began 
formulating a contingency plan to thwart the possibility of Iran’s artillery, assembled at 
various border points, falling into the hands of Iraqi forces if Kurdish held positions 
should fall.230  The Iraqi Kurds faced incredible odds as the fighting continued.  
Normally, severe winters blanketed the Zagros Mountains, which would have stymied 
combat and given the Peshmerga valuable time to regroup.  But, an abnormally warm 
weather pattern allowed for the continuation of Iraqi bombing offensives on Kurdish 
positions.231  As the war, and support to the Iraqi Kurds, became increasingly costly and 
risky for Iran, the Shah considered the possibility making a deal with Iraq over the 
boundary of the Shatt al-ʿArab.  While in a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State in 
Zürich, Switzerland (February 18, 1975), the Shah informed Kissinger of his openness to 
consider negotiations with the Baʿth regime.232  This disclosure to Kissinger revealed the 
first direct indication of Iran possibly abandoning the Iraqi Kurds.  A month earlier, 
Barzani had sent Kissinger a detailed letter outlining his current political and military 
situation, and again asked for additional U.S. support.233  Kissinger, fully aware of 
Barzani’s position, reminded the Shah that if Iran forsook the Iraqi Kurds in favor of a 
concession on the Shatt al-ʿArab, the resulting collapse of the Iraqi Kurds would 
destabilize the entire region.234  Further, Kissinger warned the Shah against believing any 
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assurances the Iraqi regime would give regarding the administration of the Kurdish 
region.235  In addition, Kissinger expressed his concern to the Shah that the Soviets would 
perceive Iran’s withdrawal as “symptomatic of the growing weakness of the West,” and 
thus increase “adventurism” in the region.236  At the end of the meeting, the Shah 
indicated to Kissinger that he would continue Iran’s support of the Iraqi Kurds.237  
Reflecting in his memoirs, Kissinger considered the discussion hypothetical in nature, 
and not a deal already in progress between Iran and Iraq.238  Nonetheless, in the 
appearance of fairness, Kissinger forwarded his impressions of the meeting to President 
Ford and Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States.   
Kissinger had the Shah’s reassurance of continued Kurdish support, but he 
reported to both Ford and Dinitz that the Shah felt the Kurds “have had it.”239  Even so, 
Kissinger replied positively to Barzani’s January letter expressing appreciation for the 
KDP leader’s “valiant effort” and indicating Barzani should “send a trusted emissary to 
Washington to give the US Government further information about the situation.”240  
Clearly, Kissinger intended to maintain covert support of the Iraqi Kurds and felt he had 
dissuaded the Shah from abandoning the Peshmerga.  Paramount to Kissinger’s strategy 
in the region resided in keeping Iraq “off balance” with fighting the Iranian-backed Iraqi 
Kurds, thereby diminishing Soviet influence in the region.  The secret support to Barzani, 
made through and with additional assistance from Iran, kept Kissinger’s regional plan 
viable without having to disclose to the U.S. Congress the covert operation.  As Kissinger 
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extrapolated, if the Shah gave up support of the Iraqi Kurds in favor of settling with Iraq 
over the Shatt al-ʿArab boundary dispute, Congress, already deeply involved in pulling 
out of Indochina, would provide neither militarily nor financially support the Iraqi 
Kurds.241  Even Barzani seemed unaware of Iran’s consideration of negotiating with Iraq.  
Certainly, Kissinger’s reply to the KDP leader led him to understand that support would 
continue for an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region, along with military and financial 
assistance in the fighting. 
Prior to the Shah attending the March 1975 OPEC meeting in Algiers, Barzani 
sent the Iranian leader a message that read, in part, of the Peshmerga’s ability to capture 
multiple enemy positions, but with heavy casualties.242  In the same statement, Barzani 
noted, “to hold those positions is impossible for us.”243  The contents of the letter greatly 
added to the Shah’s already expressed doubt about the competency of the Iraqi Kurds.  
When the Shah received words of assurance, communicated through an Egyptian adviser 
of President Anwar Sadat, that Iraq would reduce their ties with the Soviet Union if Iran 
would cease military pressure, the fate of the Iraqi Kurds appeared sealed.244  In a deal 
with the Baʿth regime, the Shah realized his goal of Iranian sovereignty over the eastern 
half of the Shatt al-ʿArab.  In the same instance, the Iraqi Kurds lost all Iranian support, 
and with it, the assistance of the United States.  The 1975 Algiers Agreement, the Iranian-
Iraqi accord signed on March 6, 1975, effectively ceased all Iranian aid to the Iraqi Kurds 
and their nationalist movement. 
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ALL AID CEASES  
Mediated by Houari Boumédiène, President of Algeria, the 1975 Algiers 
Agreement between Iran and Iraq settled border disputes in the Shatt al-ʿArab and the 
Khuzestan Province.  The main provisions handed the Shah control of the eastern side of 
the river at the thalweg, thus granting Iran unimpeded access to the Shatt al-ʿArab.  In 
return, Hussein succeeded in stopping Iran from funding the Iraqi Kurds.  Both countries 
agreed to work together on border security and favorable relations.245 
 The stunning announcement of the accord’s adoption caught Kissinger off guard.  
In his memoir, Kissinger related how the Shah’s “actions were brutal and 
indefensible.”246  He further added his displeasure with the Iranian leader’s decision and 
deceptive methods.247  Yet Kissinger admitted the Shah’s pronouncement served Iran’s 
security needs, and eliminated the additional financial toll on the country in continued 
support to Barzani and his Peshmerga.248  With the tenuous position of the Iraqi Kurds, 
Iran would need to make a direct military assault on Iraq to gain any substantial 
ground.249  That move would precipitate a war between Iran and Iraq, which the Shah did 
not want.  As previously mentioned, the U.S. would be disinclined to back any such 
Iranian military action.  And, any overt American involvement would risk revealing the 
current U.S. covert activity in the area. 
Before holding a joint press conference with Saddam Hussein announcing the 
agreement, the Shah sent Barzani a one day notice of Iran’s intent.  Delivered through an 
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Iranian general, the stipulations presented to the KDP leader included the closure of the 
border to all movement; the immediate cessation of all Iranian aid; the allowance of only 
small Peshmerga groups to take refuge in Iran; and, specifically directed at Barzani, the 
cautionary note to settle with Iraq on whatever conditions he could muster.250  In 
communicating with Kissinger, the Shah framed his position in Cold War terms.  After 
relating that the Iraqi Kurds would have one week to resolve whether to stay in Iraq or 
retreat to Iran, a safe haven, the Shah stressed to the Secretary of State that Iran and Iraq 
would work jointly to determine which “Kurds were good and which were bad (read 
Communist).”251  The message intended to reassure Kissinger that the region would 
remain free of communist influences. 
 Despite giving assurances that Barzani and his Peshmerga had until March 20, 
1975, to accept refuge in Iran or face the consequences of staying in Iraq, the Baʿth 
regime initiated a full scale assault on the Iraqi Kurds the day after the joint 
announcement.252  In desperation, Barzani sent Kissinger a letter, on March 10, 
beseeching him to intervene in the onslaught by using his personal influence with the 
Shah to help the Iraqi Kurds.253  Further, Barzani wrote, “Our movement and people are 
being destroyed in an unbelievable way with silence from everyone. We feel Your 
Excellency that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our 
people who have committed themselves to your country’s policy.”254  Truly, the United 
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States, through Kissinger, had invested a considerable amount of money and effort to 
covertly support the Iraqi Kurds in destabilizing the Baʿth regime, and consequently 
thwart Soviet intentions in the region.  But, Kissinger saw U.S.-Iranian relations as the 
primary concern.  The Shah remained America’s staunchest ally in the Persian Gulf.  If 
the U.S. pushed back on the Shah’s decision, with no American guarantee of support, the 
U.S. risked alienating a key ally.  And, the U.S. could not overtly fund the Iraqi Kurds 
without Iran’s support.  Since the Shah had ultimately made the decision, Kissinger 
reasoned the U.S. had little choice but to consent to Iran’s resolve.255  As such, Kissinger 
let slide a response to Barzani’s urgent plea for help. 
The signing of the 1975 Algiers Accord abruptly stopped all aid to Barzani and 
his Peshmerga, and the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement, as Iran no longer had a need 
to support the rebellion.  Covert funding from the United States halted, as well, with the 
exception of the March allocation.256  Without the financial and military provisions, and 
the advanced weaponry needed to fight the Iraqi forces, the Iraqi Kurds were soundly 
defeated.  On March 21, Barzani finally issued an end to all Iraqi Kurdish resistance.257  
Less than a week later, Barzani and his family went into exile.258  By the end of the 
cease-fire on April 1, over 100,000 Iraqi Kurds had crossed over into Iran.  Of those Iraqi 
Kurds who accepted the Baʿth regime’s terms and stayed in Iraq, their plight consisted of 
suffering authoritarian rule in Kurdistan259, or resettlement to southern Iraq.260  Through 
it all, Kissinger remained steadfast in his Cold War strategy and committed to a healthy 
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U.S.-Iranian relationship despite the devastation suffered by the Iraqi Kurds and to their 
nationalist movement. 
In 1976, the village VOICE published an article, entitled “A 24-Page Special 
Supplement: The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read. The Pike Papers: 
An Introduction by Aaron Latham,” describing the findings of the 1975 Pike Committee, 
headed by U.S. Representative Otis G. Pike.  The leaked report, never official released, 
stated the intent of U.S. covert funding to Barzani and the KDP amounted to keeping Iraq 
off balance, and not in supporting the Kurdish nationalist movement.  The special 
supplement went further to assert the Pike Committee claimed that Ford, Kissinger and 
the Shah hoped the Iraqi Kurds “would not prevail,” but instead “sap the resources of our 
ally’s neighboring country [Iraq].”261  The U.S. and Iran failed to disclose the real 
objective behind their policy towards the Iraqi Kurds, and as such, Barzani fought with 
the notion that he and the Kurdish nationalist movement had full American support.262  
Latham claimed that “even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical 
enterprise.”263  A quote attributed to Kissinger, “Covert action should not be confused 
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V. AMERICA ABANDONS THE IRAQI KURDS 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the lead up to and the abrupt 1975 termination 
of U.S. and Iranian support, and the plight of Barzani and his Peshmerga’s resistance, 
appeared to collapse the Kurdish nationalist movement.  This chapter further details 
America’s abandonment of the Iraqi Kurds and their quest for autonomy after the 1975 
Algiers Agreement, the dramatic transfer of power in Iran, and the shifting of alliances in 
the Persian Gulf.  Faced with yet more troubles and devastation, an examination of 
changing U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf and the impact of those transformations on the 
Kurdish nationalist movement will ensue.   
Saddam Hussein, whose power and prestige within the Baʿth regime had steadily 
increased, now had the military and political means to deal with the Iraqi Kurds on his 
terms.  No longer seen as posing a threat to national unity, Saddam implemented a series 
of policies and programs aimed at eliminating any Kurdish resistance.  Systematically, 
the Iraqi regime began destroying whole villages, which totaled some 1,400 communities 
by 1978.265  The regime also deported upwards to 600,000 Iraqi Kurds to resettlement 
camps located around major towns, all of which allowed for easy access by the Iraqi 
military.266  Those newly constructed camps, surrounded by barb wire, included large 
avenues to allow for easy access by the Iraqi military in the event an uprising needed put 




                                                 
down.267  Kurdish families of active Barzani supporters, or refugees that returned after 
the period of amnesty, found themselves exiled to southern Iraq.268  Immediate execution 
awaited any Iraqi Kurd found returning to their ancestral lands.269  The relocations to the 
southern regions of Iraq hit Iraqi Kurds particularly hard as the environment, both 
climatically and socially, posed a dramatic change from the environs of their 
homelands.270   Saddam’s policies intended to divide and conquer the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, and to assimilate the Iraqi Kurds into Arab culture.271  Programs existed 
within the resettlement areas to re-educate Kurds on national unity and the virtues of the 
Iraqi Baʿth doctrine.272  At the same time, the Baʿth regime encouraged and supported 
Arab Iraqis to settle in formerly predominate Kurdish villages and towns, and awarded 
money to Arab men who took Kurdish wives.273  Of those remaining Iraqi Kurds in the 
north, some received large cash payments, which amounted to a form of bribery to 
support the government.274  The regime’s anticipated outcomes, the elimination of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement and the integration of Iraqi Kurds into Arab society, led to 
multiple clashes between Iraqi Kurds and military forces brought about by the forced 
displacements and the imposed indoctrination programs.275  While many Iraqi 
government policies accomplished the suppression of a cohesive Kurdish opposition, 
dissension remained among pockets of Iraqi Kurds. 
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With Barzani in exile, and the KDP in disarray, the Kurdish nationalist movement 
seemed all but forgotten.  The Shah of Iran held fast to the 1975 Algiers Agreement and 
allowed no concessions to the Iraqi Kurds.  In the interest of maintaining a firm Cold War 
alliance with Iran, and in favor of U.S. corporations doing business with Iraq, the United 
States also declined any type of assistance to the Kurds in Iraq.   Moreover, no offers of 
government support, nor relief efforts, came from individual countries or the international 
community.276  As noted in a May 1, 1975, United States Central Intelligence Agency 
document, produced in coordination with the State Department, the King of Jordan, 
Hussein bin Talal, expressed grave concern over the accord and the plight of the Kurds.  
In the overview, the King hoped a settlement between Iraq and Barzani might be reached 
to allow for the KDP leader to remain head of the Kurdish community.277  But beyond 
Jordan’s voiced concerns, no efforts were exerted on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds at large.  
The lack of constraints imposed on Iraq by neighboring countries or the international 
community allowed the regime to act with impunity. 
IRAQ 
 In fact, the 1975 settlement of the thalweg line had averted a full scale Iran-Iraq 
war, and brought about improved relations among all the Gulf neighbors.  The Iraqi 
Kurds no longer posed an internal threat to the Baʿthist regime by fomenting instability.  
And, Iran lost any leverage over Iraq with the signing of the accord, which led to 
improved Iranian-Iraqi relations as the Shah strictly adhered to the agreement.  As such, 
276 McDowall, Modern History Kurds, 340. 
277 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, eds. Monica 
Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 286, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d286 (accessed September 22, 2018). 
77 
 
                                                 
Iraq turned its focus to domestic economic growth and building up its military power.278  
Recognizing its regional strength depended on lessening Iraq’s dependence on the Soviet 
Union, the Baʿth regime endeavored to project a more nonaligned position.279  In truth, 
Saddam coveted the role of leader of nonaligned countries.280  He saw Iraq’s future, and 
by extension his role, as the new regional head of the Arab nation.  Subsequently, Iraq’s 
diminishing reliance on the Soviet Union paved the way for greater opportunities with the 
West.  Indeed, Iraqi relations with the West improved, particularly with France.  
Although diplomatic ties with the U.S. remained nonexistent, U.S.-Iraqi economic 
relations burgeoned.281  To that point, the West’s increased demand for Iraqi oil, due to 
the global oil crisis of 1973-1974, greatly benefitted the Iraqi regime and opened 
previously unavailable pathways to Western technologies.282  While Iraq invested heavily 
in its military apparatus, the regime also put money into industry, infrastructure, schools, 
clinics, and hospitals.283  The Iraqi regime moved to better situate itself in the Gulf region 
after the 1975 accord.  Internally, Saddam positioned himself as the de facto leader of 
Iraq.  As Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr’s health deteriorated and he withdrew from active 
politics, Saddam’s authority increased exponentially.  In July 1979, Saddam formally 
assumed the presidency.284  Iraq, now under Saddam Hussein, proved a formidable rival 
for the leadership of the Arab world. 
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TROUBLES FOR THE SHAH OF IRAN 
After 1975, not only did the Iraqi Kurds face harsh conditions, the Shah of Iran 
faced an increasingly hostile Iranian populace.  In 1963, the Shah had launched the White 
Revolution, a series of social, political, and economic reforms, which he anticipated 
would elevate the country economically while maintaining a semblance of traditional 
governance.285  During the following decade, his programs initially succeeded in bringing 
about many of the anticipated outcomes.  Oil revenues helped feed Iran’s economic 
growth, however, infrastructural and industrial developments produced the bulk of the 
expansion.286  The Shah’s land reform, which disenfranchised many large landholders, 
turned countless sharecroppers into yeoman farmers.287  While the Shah claimed 
continuing success of his White Revolution, he became progressively isolated from the 
social and political unrest caused by his restructurings. 
Among the critics of the Shah’s White Revolution, the Shi’a clergy proved the 
most vocal.  Along with the proposed disenfranchisement of landlords, the ulama 
(Islamic scholars), many of whom were also landowners, would become marginalized by 
expanding bureaucracy.  The land reform threatened to diminish their power, particularly 
in rural areas where the mullahs served as village mediators in political and social 
matters, and if a need arose, offered financial assistance to destitute villagers.288  A 
leading voice of criticism quickly emerged from among the upper clergy, that of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  In 1963, after the new policy announcement, Ayatollah 
Khomeini gave a speech admonishing the Shah for conceding Islam and Iranian 
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sovereignty to the West.289  He also derided the Shah for granting rights to women.290   
The 1963 address, in which he called the Shah “you wretched, miserable man,” and the 
ensuing anti-Shah protests in Qom, landed the ayatollah in exile for the next fourteen 
years.291  Qom housed the center for Shi’ite religious study in Iran.292  The Shah’s 
mounting dependence on the United States, his growing cult of personality, and the 
purposeful sidelining of the clergy inextricably pitted the ayatollah against the 
government.  In the ten years following the institution of reforms, Iran transitioned into a 
state heavily supported by petrodollars and the West, deeply submerged in bureaucracy, 
and led by an increasing isolated autocrat. 
Several scholars noted that the Shah’s domestic agenda steered the country 
towards rebellion as his policies managed to disenfranchise the landed aristocracy, the 
ulama, and bazaar merchants.293  Replaced by technocrats uninterested in personal 
networks, many small rural farmers and villagers moved to larger urban areas where they 
found growing urban blight, housing shortages, and rising unemployment.294  Many 
younger, educated members of the newly made middle class felt betrayed by the Shah’s 
regime, as promised jobs in the public sector failed to materialize.295  The SAVAK, the 
Shah’s secret police, dealt severely with dissidents, and in general, harassed common 
Iranians who spoke out against the government.296  Also perceived as complicit with the 
Iranian state stood the United States.  The Western-style secular democracy urged by the 
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U.S. contrasted with the mounting anti-imperialism sentiment felt by many.  Increasing, 
larger numbers of Iranians viewed the Shah as a pawn of the United States.297  Iran’s 
domestic situation stood in stark contrast to the Shah’s grandiose self-perception as 
Shahanshah (king of kings). 
JIMMY CARTER 
U.S.-Iranian relations peaked during Kissinger’s tenure.  When Jimmy Carter 
took office in 1977, the 39th president interjected human rights as a central component of 
America’s foreign policy.  Although the Shah had enjoyed friendly relations with the 
U.S. despite the political affiliation of the incumbent president, the new Carter 
administration posed a quandary largely due to the emphasis on improving human rights 
around the world.298  Past administrations overlooked charges of human rights violations 
in Iran, but Carter seized the opportunity of his presidency to call upon the Shah to make 
meaningful reforms.299  As one of America’s key allies in the Middle East, Carter pressed 
the Shah towards improvements, but declined to make military sales conditional upon 
Iranian human rights advancements.300  Unlike the relationship enjoyed by the Nixon 
administration and the Iranian leader, Carter and the Shah experienced an uneasy, and at 
times tenuous, association.  The Shah’s visit to the U.S. in November 1977, and Carter’s 
trip to Tehran a month later, intended to show U.S. support for the Iranian government, 
instead helped fuel domestic unrest in Iran.301  In addition to the Shah’s growing 
autocracy and his founding of the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) party, which formed a one 
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party system, the cumulative influence of the West on Iran intensified tensions within the 
country.302  Iran sat on the verge of political explosion.     
These historical forces led to the Iranian Revolution, a series of events between 
1978-1979 that toppled the Shah of Iran and his government in December 1978.303  The 
new Islamic Republic, eventually led by Khomeini, rejected Western imperialism in 
favor of an anti-Western theocracy.304  In the opinion of many Iranians, they equated the 
United States as equal an enemy as the Shah.    Initially, the United States prevaricated on 
how best to respond to the open hostilities and rebellion against the Shah prior to his 
ouster.  Caught between his human rights stance and the understanding that armed forces 
might be required to put down the revolution, Carter is accused of equivocating as he 
understood the vital role Iran played in protecting America’s access to Persian Gulf oil 
and containing Soviet encroachment in the region.305  Equally divided, Carter’s 
administration counseled the president with opposing views on the course of action the 
Shah should take.306  In the lead-up to the Shah’s departure from Iran, Carter neglected to 
call the Shah directly.307  His indecision to personally advise the Iranian leader reflected 
the administration’s dueling Iranian policy between human rights reformers and military 
hawks.308  Although the administration’s foreign policy agenda with its emphasis on 
human rights contributed less to the Iranian Revolution than the Shah’s own policies, 
Carter’s vacillation added to the Shah’s own uncertainties.  Those insecurities led to the 
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Shah to take both a military stance and a conciliatory position.309  In the end, neither the 
Shah nor the U.S. could stop the forces of anti-Pahlavian rule and anti-Western 
sentiment. 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
November 4, 1979, proved the effective date of severed relations between the 
U.S. and Iran.310  After the collapse of Iran’s secular provisional government, and 
preceding the referendum vote on the new Islamic Republic constitution with Khomeini 
as its leader, Iranian students took to the streets in protest and seized sixty-three 
Americans as hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran.311  Anger over Carter’s decision 
to allow the deposed Shah to enter the U.S. for medical treatment precipitated the 
capturing of the U.S. embassy.312  In response, Carter froze Iranian assets in U.S. banks, 
expelled both Iranian diplomats and students from America, initiated international 
financial sanctions against Iran along with obtaining a censure from the International 
Court of Justice, and finally, cut diplomatic ties with the new Iranian regime.313  The 
release of American hostages occurred later on January 20, 1981.314  The warm 
association between the United States and Iran, initially based on Cold War concerns and 
easy U.S. access to Middle Eastern oil, evaporated into a decidedly adversarial 
relationship. 
The signing of the Algiers Agreement contributed to a series of events that 
ultimately toppled the Shah of Iran, placed Khomeini in control of the country, and 
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severed U.S.-Iranian relations.  Beginning with the Shah’s loss of confidence in the Iraqi 
Kurds’ fighting ability against the Baʿth regime, and emboldened by the ostensibly 
unconditional support of the United States, the Shah negotiated a boundary settlement 
with Saddam.  With the Iraqi Kurds then firmly under the control of Iraq and posing no 
real threat to the Iraqi regime, Iranian-Iraqi relations warmed considerably.  The tentative 
alliance allowed for the opening of previously closed borders and the resumption of 
Iranian pilgrimages to Karbala and Najaf, Iraq.315  Both cities play significant religious 
roles in Shi’a Islam.  Khomeini’s growing prominence and ability to communicate more 
readily with his Iranian followers, who visited the exiled ayatollah in Iraq while on 
pilgrimage and transported his messages back to Iran via cassette tapes, threatened the 
Shah.  The opening with Baghdad after 1975 provided the Shah with an opportunity to 
ask Saddam to remove Khomeini from Iraq, thus relieving Tehran of the perceived threat 
from the cleric.  In actuality, Iraq’s deportation of Khomeini to Paris in 1978 opened a 
larger, more readily available avenue for revolutionary thought to reach Iranians already 
fomenting dissent against the Shah.316  The Shah of Iran’s expectations, beginning with 
his reassessment of Iraqi Kurds’ capabilities in December 1974, and their subsequent 
impact, eventually led to his deposition. 
THE CARTER DOCTRINE 
Although Carter lost his bid for re-election, the Carter Doctrine he initiated in 
January 1980, stating the vital importance of the Persian Gulf to U.S. interests and any 
attempt by an outside force to gain control of the region would be met with military 
action, if needed, provided the framework for the incoming administration of Ronald W. 
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Reagan.317  The Carter Doctrine also disclosed U.S. concerns that the revolutionary 
atmosphere, actively propagated by Iranian leaders, would spread to other Middle Eastern 
states with large Shi’a populations, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.318  
Carter’s change in foreign policy emphasis, nonetheless, exhibited Cold War concerns.  
His doctrine revealed U.S. fears that the anti-American sentiment in Iran could lead that 
country to closer ties with the Soviet Union.  More importantly, the Soviet’s 1979 
invasion of Afghanistan greatly added to U.S. concerns that Moscow might have further 
designs to control oil assets in the Middle East.319  Carter’s unsuccessful diplomacy 
efforts in Iran, which included eschewing direct contact with Khomeini, and the Soviet 
Union’s move in Afghanistan, led him to take a more traditional Cold War stance that 
included attempts at a military build-up in the Gulf region, increased covert activity in 
Iran, and an overall increase in defense spending.320  Foregoing his former human rights 
emphasis in foreign policy, Carter reverted to a Cold War stance that placed Soviet 
containment as a top U.S. priority. 
SADDAM TAKES CHARGE 
After the signing of the Camp David Accords, dynamics in the Middle East 
changed further when Saddam Hussein assumed a more active political role in the region.  
When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 agreement, the Arab League, 
formed in 1945 to champion Arab states interests, expelled Egypt from its ranks.321  With 
Egypt no longer the head of the Arab League, Saddam made moves to claim a leadership 
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role in the Arab world.322  He also worked diligently to solidify his position within Iraq.  
During the same period, the Iraqi regime began distancing itself from the Soviet Union, 
as evident by al-Bakr’s anniversary speech on July 17, 1978, in which no mention of the 
Soviet Union or the Soviet Friendship Treaty occurred.323  After Saddam became 
president and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Carter’s administration cautiously 
reached out to the new Iraqi head of state with overtures for more, open relations, all in 
an attempt to counter possible Soviet moves in the region.324  Nevertheless, U.S.-Iraqi 
relations remained negligible as Saddam focused on consolidating his power, particularly 
in the Kurdish areas and among the Shi’a, and solidifying Iraq as the pivotal Arab 
state.325  Although Iraq benefitted from good trading relations with the West, Saddam 
saw no benefit in improved U.S.-Iraqi relations.  In fact, Saddam positioned himself as 
the principal leader of anti-imperialism in the region, and as such, he shunned any signs 
of weakness by avoiding alignment with either of the two super powers.  Saddam felt 
secure in his regional military standing and growing international presence. 
With Khomeini’s vocal call for the spread of the Islamic revolution into Iraq, 
Saddam redoubled his efforts to champion secular Arab nationalism in the Middle 
East.326  The animosity between the two leaders not only stemmed from their opposing 
ideologies, but from the animus Khomeini felt for Saddam after being expelled from Iraq 
in 1978.327  Sensing a possible risk to his regime, and suspecting the splintering Iranian 
military indicated a weakness in Khomeini’s leadership, Saddam challenged the 1975 
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Shatt al-ʿArab agreement.328  His move signaled Iraq’s intent to reclaim and fortify the 
territory lost to Iran, and shore up the country’s status in the Gulf.329  A week after 
Saddam officially abrogated the 1975 agreement, in September 1980,   Iraqi forces 
crossed over into Iranian.330  The Iran-Iraq War began in earnest. 
IRAQI KURDS SPLINTER  
While Saddam flexed his military might against Iran, the now fractured Iraqi 
Kurds continued their hit-and-run tactics against the regime; however, the two major 
factions spent as much energy fighting each other for control of the overall Kurdish 
nationalist movement as they did Saddam’s government.331  After the death of Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani in 1979, his two sons, Idris and Masoud, took command of the KDP.332  
A former lieutenant of the elder Barzani, Jalal Talabani, disgruntled with the direction of 
the movement, broke from the KDP and formed the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK).333  Talabani’s umbrella organization challenged the KDP for what he saw as “the 
inability of the feudalist, tribalist, bourgeois rightist and capitulationist Kurdish 
leadership” to assert autonomy for Iraqi Kurds.334  The intense conflict between the rivals 
would last until May 1987 when the two groups joined other smaller Kurdish militant 
groups, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Assyrian Democratic Movement, an ethnic 
political party in Iraq, to form a Kurdistan Front.335  As previously discussed, within Iraq, 
the Kurds themselves experienced major turmoil, characterized by resettlement, 
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Arabization in many sectors of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the bitter fighting between the KDP 
and the PUK for control of the nationalist movement.  The Kurdistan region churned with 
upheaval and open rebellion as the Kurds fought each other, and continued their on-going 
battle with the Iraqi regime. 
Although ideologically divided, the two major Kurdish nationalist camps caused 
additional trouble for Saddam as each claimed to represent the movement.  Talabani’s 
faction, more left-leaning, democratic, and possessing a socialist political philosophy, 
stood in contrast to the KDP, who tended towards the traditional and conservative, and 
ascribing to a tribal political philosophy.336  Saddam now faced negotiating with both 
competing factions over the governance of Iraqi Kurdistan.  At the same time, the KDP 
and the PUK fought against the Iraqi regime, and on occasion, the KDP along with Iran 
against the Iraqi regime.337  The level of Iranian assistance to the KDP in no way reached 
that of the Shah’s Kurdish policy.338  While minimal aid passed from Iran to Iraqi Kurds, 
Saddam supported the Iranian Kurdish opposition against Khomeini.339  Both Iran and 
Iraq employed the Kurds in order to gain an upper hand in the war, but both regimes 
neglected to support an autonomous region.  The United States, for its part, maintained a 
non-committal attitude towards Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and refrained from offering any 
financial or military support as it had during the Shah’s reign. 
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RONALD REAGAN AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
U.S.-Iranian relations changed little when Ronald Reagan won the 1980 
presidential election.  Taking office one minute before the release of the American 
hostages in Iran, Reagan enjoyed the successful freeing of the embassy officials Carter 
had worked so diligently to achieve.  Despite the release, Iran remained a hostile nation 
as Khomeini continued to espouse anti-American rhetoric and labeled the U.S. as “the 
Great Satan.”340  The dual threats of spreading Islamic fundamentalism and Cold War 
concerns of Soviet encroachment, however, led the new administration to tilt towards 
Saddam’s regime to counter those perceived menaces.  As previously mentioned, the 
grave concern of Islamic radicalism spreading outward from Iran into neighboring states 
occupied much attention in forming America’s foreign policy.  Nonetheless, the U.S. 
officially maintained a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).341  With 
Soviet-Iraqi relations at a low point, and American companies increasing business with 
Iraq, Baghdad seemed the logical regime to support in the Persian Gulf.  The Soviets had 
pledged neutrality at the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, and went so far as turning back two 
ships loaded with arms originally destined for Iraq.342  Saddam viewed the Soviets’ 
stance as unacceptable.343  As such, Reagan assessed the situation as advantageous to 
America’s interest and focused his administration on building U.S.-Iraqi relations to 
thwart Iranian ambitions and counter Soviet expansion in the region. 
At the heart of America’s interest in the Middle East lay easy accessibility to oil.  
As part of Saddam’s calculations in launching a war with Iran, he sought to gain control 
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of Iran’s Khuzestan Province, a major oil producing region.344  Aside from the prestige a 
conquest would earn him in the Arab world, the oil seized from the capture would greatly 
enhance Saddam’s reserves and revenue.345  Initially making advances into Iranian 
territory, Saddam appeared to have the upper hand in the war.346  But in 1982, Iran made 
huge gains with an effective counteroffensive that pushed Iraqi forces back across the 
border and into Iraq.347  In June 1982, Saddam called for a cease-fire and offered an Iraqi 
withdrawal to the established international borders.348  Khomeini rejected the proposition, 
and in the following years, the war widened.  One of the main targets of both countries 
included targeting each other’s oil facilities and oil tankers in the hopes of disrupting, and 
cutting off, oil revenues necessary to fund their war efforts.349  As the war spilled over 
into the Persian Gulf, and America’s access to Gulf oil at stake, the U.S. began sharing 
intelligence satellite imagery with Iraq to assist with Iraqi defensive moves against 
Iran.350  The dual threat of Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism extending into Iraq, and more 
importantly, possible limitations on Western oil supplies, moved the Reagan 
administration to tangibly act in Iraq’s favor. 
REAGAN REMOVES IRAQ FROM TERRORISM LIST 
While acknowledging the ruthlessness of Saddam and his regime, Iran’s 1982 war 
gains caused the White House greater apprehension.  The threat of spreading Islamic 
fundamentalism outweighed U.S. unease over Saddam’s tactics and support of dissent 
groups, separatist organizations, and the Abu Nidal organization, a splinter group from 
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the Palestine Liberation Organization.351  Consequently, the Reagan administration took 
concrete steps to assist Saddam by removing Iraq from the United States’ State Sponsors 
of Terrorism list on February 26, 1982.352  By doing so, the move allowed for the 
offering of U.S. export credits and the loosening of export controls.353  Now off the 
terrorist list, the available U.S. Agriculture Department Commodity Credit guarantees 
provided a mechanism for Saddam to purchase much needed food supplies, which prior 
cash strapped Iraq lacked the ability to obtain.354  The guarantees enabled Iraq to make 
purchases of badly needed grain and other agricultural commodities to support its 
struggling domestic population.  Full diplomatic relations with Iraq occurred two years 
later, but the path forward started with Iran’s 1982 war advantage and America’s fear of 
Islamic fundamentalism spreading into Iraq. 
OPERATION STAUNCH AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
Concurrent to surreptitiously supporting Saddam in the Iran-Iraq War, the Reagan 
administration initiated a plan, Operation Staunch, to stem the flow of arm sales by 
American allies to Iran.355  Paradoxically, from 1985 to1986, the Reagan administration 
clandestinely sold weapons to Iran in exchange for U.S. hostages taken in Lebanon by 
radical Islamic groups supported by Khomeini.356  The White House diverted profits 
from those sales to fund the Nicaraguan Contras, the American-backed 
counterrevolutionaries fighting the Sandinista (Sandinista National Liberation Front) 
regime, led by Daniel Ortega.357  After exposure, the arrangement became known as the 
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Iran-Contra Affair.358  Later, the White House maintained the main purpose of the 
weapons sales were intended to ease U.S.-Iranian relations.359  Even though the scheme 
appeared to influence the release of the hostages, it precipitated more hostage taking in 
the Middle East.360  And, U.S.-Iranian relations remained as they had prior to the 
hostages’ release.  The opposing White House agendas demonstrated the administration’s 
inability to effectively develop a cohesive Middle East plan nor exercise diplomatic 
efforts to effect or direct events in favor of American aims in the region.  The Iran-Iraq 
War raged on in a battle of attrition. 
U.S. ASSESSES IRAQI KURDS’ THREAT LEVEL 
At no time since the 1975 cessation of aid to Barzani and the KDP did the U.S. 
give any official consideration to the Iraqi Kurds’ plight.  Even though the Kurdish 
nationalist movement, now fractured into several splinter groups and led by one of the 
two main camps, the KDP or the PUK, persisted with continuous and multiple skirmishes 
against Iraqi forces along the Kurdistan borders, the United States deemed the nationalist 
movement inconsequential to U.S. aims in the region.  The CIA kept track of the Iraqi 
Kurdish dissidents’ activities, but determined they posed no actual danger to Saddam’s 
regime.361  A CIA assessment report, issued December 23, 1983, clearly outlined the 
agency’s perception that the Iraqi Kurds lacked the ability to form a common front 
against Saddam, as their animosity towards each other precluded any ability to coordinate 
a real threat to the Iraqi regime.362  The assessment also commented that both Kurdish 
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camps maintained minimal contact with the Soviet Union, so the possibility of Soviet 
involvement in favor of the Iraqi Kurds remained negligible.363  As America’s primary 
concern in the region remained the security of the Persian Gulf and the maintaining of 
international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. gave little weight to the 
Iraqi Kurds’ battles with Iraq.364  The focus of America’s Gulf policy centered on 
supporting Iraq as the least objectionable belligerent, and the country that would award 
more favorable outcomes for the United States at the end of the war. 
U.S. RESTORES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ 
In November 1984, the United States restored diplomatic relations with Iraq.365  
The reinstatement allowed for more intelligence sharing and an increase in the issuance 
of U.S. dual-use technology (technologies used for civilian purposes but also possessing 
military applications) licenses.366  Since 1974, Iraq had acquired weapons and chemical 
weapon technology and components from Western nations, primarily France, Germany, 
and Italy, with the full knowledge of the White House.367  Although the official U.S. 
position on the Iran-Iraq War remained one of neutrality, the Reagan administration 
undertook a more determined position with economic and military aid to Iraq after the 
restoration of official diplomacy. 
  As early as 1974, it was intimated that the Iraqi regime employed chemical 
warfare against its Kurdish population.368  In a December 19, 1983, status report on 
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National Security Decision Directive 114, which outlined U.S. policy toward the Iran-
Iraq War, to Robert C. McFarlane, the National Security Advisor, implicated Iraq on the 
use of chemical weapons against Iran.369  More, substantiated reports surfaced in 
early1984, issued by the United Nations Security Council, that Saddam revived the use of 
chemical agents.370  The targeted areas of chemical weapons use occurred along the 
border regions between Iraq and Iran.  As early as 1983, the CIA reported, Iraq dropped 
chemical bombs in the Hajj Umran and Mount Kordeman region and areas in the Penjwin 
district, locales heavily populated by Kurds.371  Saddam, in direct violation of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol Banning the Use of Chemical Weapons in War, which Iraq signed in 
1931, denied the use of chemical warfare.372  The White House protested Saddam’s use 
of chemicals, and led the UN condemnation against Iraq.373  In addition, the Reagan 
administration halted sales of five chemical compounds to Iraq, and Iran, which at the 
time had not been implicated in the use of chemical weapons.374  The cessation of sales to 
both countries intended to emphasize U.S. neutrality in the war.375  Nonetheless, U.S.-
Iraqi relations progressed forward with increased U.S. economic and military aid to 
support Iraq in the war while the Reagan administration ignored the end use of the 
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provisions.  No action, or official communique, emanated from the U.S. government to 
specifically aid those Iraqi Kurds or Kurdish villages hit with chemical gas.   
In a March 31, 1984, New York Times article, written by Bernard Gwertzman and 
entitled “U.S. Restricts Sale of 5 Chemicals to Iraq After Poison Gas Report,” John 
Hughes, the State Department spokesman, stated “in humanitarian terms, we cannot and 
should not limit our attention to the victims of chemical weapons.”376  Hughes further 
added that Iran’s attempt to spread revolution throughout the region held the greatest 
concern.  The loss of life resulting from Iran’s exertions far outweighed any concern of 
Saddam’s use of poisonous gas, which might affect civilian populations.  In the same 
article, other State Department officials claimed “that so far, Iraq had used nerve gas only 
experimentally, not in a concerted fashion.”377  Clearly, the Reagan administration 
attempted to distance itself from Iraq’s end use of technologies sold through the U.S. and 
its allies.  Although the American Secretaries of State and Commerce adopted a change 
in policy to scrutinize each export license application for its end purposes, within a year, 
previously denied licenses started getting approved.378  Part of the rationale for changing 
course and loosening export controls stemmed from the overarching concern of the 
Soviet Union gaining a foothold in the Gulf and the fear of Iran succeeding in the war.  
Therefore, the alliance of convenience with Iraq entailed the Reagan administration 
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The KDP and PUK remained adversaries during the Iran-Iraq War until 1986, 
when Talabani came to the realization that Saddam had no intentions of signing any type 
of Iraqi Kurdistan autonomy agreement with the PUK.379  Bolstered by U.S., Soviet, and 
French backing, and assured his regime would be sufficiently supported in the war, 
Saddam concluded that concessions in the form of limited regional autonomy to the PUK 
in exchange for continued assistance on the Kurdistan front no longer served his 
purposes.380  Talabani, thoroughly dissatisfied with Saddam’s stalling on signing an 
autonomy agreement, changed political association and allied with the KDP against the 
Iraqi regime.381  With the KPD and PUK working in concert, and along with Iran, the 
fighting against Iraqi forces intensified, particularly in the northern border regions with 
Turkey and Iran.382  Saddam retaliated with increasing ferocity in Kurdish population 
areas. 
The Iraqi regime stepped up its ongoing campaign of revenge massacres and 
summary executions of Iraqi Kurds; abductions of Kurdish children, youth, and young 
men for torture in hopes of garnering information on Peshmerga relatives and activities; 
and, demolishing Kurdish villages.383  In a concerted effort to reassert his government 
control over Iraqi Kurdistan, Saddam appointed his kinsman, ʿAli Hasan al-Majid, later 
dubbed Chemical Ali by Iraqis, as governor of the North on March 29, 1987.384  A month 
after his appointment, al-Majid ordered a chemical attack on the Kurdish villages of 
Balisan and Shaykh Wassan, a prelude to the all-out assault yet to come.385  The violent 
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campaign against Iraqi Kurdish resistance, called al-Anfal (the spoils of war), began in 
earnest in February 1988.386  In a scorched earth policy devised by al-Majid, Iraqi forces 
unloaded chemical bombs and high explosive air attacks on Peshmerga controlled 
areas.387  An area hit hard by aerial bombardment, the Jafati valley near Sulaymaniyah, 
resulted in heavy casualties and devastation of the countryside.388   The number of 
fatalities sustained and the severity of the losses prompted Talabani to register a formal 
accusation of genocide against the Iraqi regime.389  Yet, al-Majid kept up with the use of 
chemical weapons and heavy shelling to inflict as much destruction as possible in Iraqi 
Kurdish areas.  The Kurdish resistance began wearing down from such onslaughts.  On 
March 15, 1988, in retaliation for PUK and Iranian units capturing the town of Halabja, 
the Iraqi military unleashed a barrage of shelling that far surpassed previous 
offensives.390  The afternoon’s air took on a smell of apples and garlic, and by the 
following morning, over 5,000 people lay dead.391  Forever etched in the Iraqi Kurdish 
collective memory would be the massacre of Halabja. 
The international response to Saddam’s use of chemical bombs and the 
annihilation of thousands of Iraqi Kurds called for the condemnation of Iraq and the 
immediate suspension of weapons and materials used in the manufacture of chemical 
weapons.392  As in the past, Saddam denied the use of chemical warfare.  Further, he 
refused entry of any investigative groups into Iraq as he considered any such examination 
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meddling into his country’s internal affairs.393  Once again, the Reagan administration 
sponsored another UN Security Council resolution calling for tightening of export 
controls on many items used in the development of chemical weapons.394  The European 
Parliament also issued a formal condemnation of Iraq’s application of chemical warfare 
and extermination of thousands of Kurdish civilians.395   Correspondingly, the United 
States Congress delivered similar resolutions.  But no sanctions were imposed by the 
U.S., the UN, or the European Community.396  Despite the White House publically 
condemning Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds, the Reagan 
administration continued with military planning support to Iraq.397  In Patrick Tyler’s 
New York Times article, entitled “Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq In War Despite Use Of 
Gas,” Colonel Walther P. Lang, retired, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time, 
stated both DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and CIA officials “were desperate to 
make sure that Iraq did not lose.”398  The Reagan administration clearly disregarded the 
plight of Iraqi Kurds and the enormous loss of Kurdish civilian lives.  Further, the White 
House adopted a “no-contacts” policy towards the Iraqi Kurds.399  When Talabani made a 
visit to the State Department after the Halabja attack, Saddam registered strong 
disapproval of U.S. officials meeting with his opposition.400  On a second attempt to meet 
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with State Department officials, Talabani received a resounding snub.401  Once a strong 
supporter of the Iraqi Kurds, the United States now flatly refused any help. 
The end of the Iran-Iraq War occurred in July 1988 when Iran accepted the terms 
laid out in the UN Security Council Resolution 598 of 1987.402  Iraqi Kurdish morale, 
devastated by Saddam’s policies and chemical warfare, sank further as Iraq could now 
turn its full attention to the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan and retaliation against the 
Kurds who fought against the regime during the war.  The Iraqi Kurdish nationalist 
movement, once again, floundered as sheer survival of the Kurdish population took 
precedence.  Physically and morally shattered, the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement, as 
it had been, ceased to exist.     
Reagan’s policies on the Persian Gulf greatly impacted Kurdish aims for 
statehood.  By ignoring the West’s sale of arms and chemicals to Iraq, and directly 
providing those same materials to Saddam’s regime, the United States directly 
contributed to the demise of the Iraqi Kurdish national movement.  The Reagan 
administration focused solely on building U.S.-Iraqi relations and preventing Iranian aims 
of spreading Islamic fundamentalism than on implications of selling arms and chemicals 
to Saddam’s regime.  Without U.S. assistance, through the restoration of U.S.-Iraqi 
diplomatic relations and the issuance of Commodity Credit guarantees, Saddam’s ability 
to purchase materials and weaponry would have been severely diminished.  The sale of 
U.S. dual-use technologies allowed Saddam’s regime to develop and deploy chemical 
agents on Iraqi Kurdish villages and Peshmerga outposts, which ultimately devastated the 
population and the countryside.  Despite reports of Iraq’s use of chemical warfare, the 
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U.S. ignored the warnings, continued to sell Saddam armament and chemical agents, and 
neglected to sanction Iraq for its use of chemical weapons.  Ultimately, the United States’ 
policy on Iraq inflicted a disastrous blow to the Kurdish nationalist movement.  Despite 
the devastation to the movement, and the scattering of tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurds to 

























 The Iraqi Kurds’ quest for a nation state began after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire in the early twentieth century.  They showed remarkable resilience, and continue 
to do so, in the face of adversity brought about by Middle East regional and international 
powers that imposed policies in favor of provincial governments that reinforced imperial 
authority prior to and during World War II.  In the Cold War era, when America’s 
strategic interest in the Middle East increased and centered on containment of Soviet 
encroachment and easy accessibility to oil, the Iraqi Kurds played a tactical yet 
subservient role in U.S. strategies devised to back America’s interests and those of its 
Middle East allies.  Those U.S. policies capitalized on Iraqi Kurdish aims for autonomy, 
while neglecting to back the Kurds’ political ambitions.  Beginning with America’s 
Persian Gulf policy that upheld Iranian supremacy in the region, the U.S. exploited Iraqi 
Kurd’s goals by secretly arranging financial aid and military weaponry through Iran and 
Israel.  America’s interest in the Iraqi Kurds hinged on keeping Iran regionally and 
politically strong thereby encouraging Iraqi Kurds in open rebellion against Iraqi forces 
to Iran’s advantage.  Construed by Iraqi Kurds as support for their goal, the initial 
diplomatic contact between U.S. officials and KDP leadership in 1972 buoyed Kurdish 
ambitions.  However, U.S. interest only resided with continuing Iranian hegemony in the 
Gulf and not with the Kurdish nationalist movement.  Although providing for aid to Iraqi 
Kurdish fighters, the U.S. declined any formal, or informal, backing for Kurdish 
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autonomy.  America’s encouragement to the KDP centered on satisfying the Shah’s 
request for assistance to the Iraqi Kurds in his battle with the Iraqi regime, not in 
providing diplomatic support for a separate Kurdish state.  The U.S. possessed no interest 
in the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement as America saw no benefit to the U.S. in Iraqi 
Kurdish autonomy.  In fact, the arming of the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion against the Baʿthist 
state characterized another military mechanism in the Shah’s arsenal in his battle with 
Iraq over the Shatt al-ʿArab, and maintaining his regional power.  White House support to 
the Iraqi Kurds balanced on the U.S. maintaining a good relationship with the Shah.  At 
no time did a push for an independent state for Iraqi Kurds play into U.S. policy decisions 
in the Gulf region.  The purpose served by the U.S. backing the Iraqi Kurds rested on 
continuing positive U.S.-Iranian relations. 
 Following the Iranian Revolution, the severance of U.S.-Iranian relations, and the 
onset of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist movement again suffered severe 
consequences from America’s Middle East policy.  As U.S. policy in the Gulf region 
tilted towards Saddam’s regime in an effort to counter the perceived threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism, the Iraqi Kurds’ rebellion against the Iraqi central government and 
ambition for autonomy collided with America’s evolving relations with Saddam’s 
regime.  Despite lacking any noteworthy diplomatic, military, or economic support from 
foreign entities, the Iraqi Kurds continued to skirmish with Iraqi forces along the 
Kurdistan borders.  For Iraqi Kurds, the nationalist movement persisted despite the 
intense infighting between the two major competing groups, the KDP and the PUK, and 
the battle for daily survival against Saddam’s forces.  The U.S. monitored Iraqi Kurdish 
activity, but determined they posed no threat to Baghdad.  With America’s Persian Gulf 
102 
 
policy in the region centered on the ready availability of oil, Cold War concerns, and 
stemming the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, supporting the Iraqi Kurds’ nationalist 
movement offered no additional benefits to the U.S. in terms of achieving America’s 
objectives in the Persian Gulf.  In general, Iraqi Kurdish autonomy held no sway in 
America’s Middle East policy.  Particularly in light of burgeoning of U.S.-Iraqi relations, 
the Iraqi Kurds proved inconsequential to the larger scheme of thwarting Iran and 
advancing Iraq’s military gains in the Gulf.  With the U.S. intent on affording Iraq an 
upper hand in the Iran-Iraq War, the removal of Saddam’s regime from the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism list and the subsequent issuance of U.S. Agriculture Department 
Commodity Credit guarantees allowed for the sale of chemicals and dual-use 
technologies to Iraq.  In spite of repeated warnings from several of its own governmental 
agencies, and backed up by UN reports, the U.S. continued to supply Iraq with chemicals 
and technologies, which Saddam weaponized and utilized on his own citizens, the Iraqi 
Kurds.  Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, much of which the United States provided, killed 
thousands of Iraqi Kurds and made hundreds of Kurdish villages uninhabitable.  The 
extermination of both Iraqi Kurdish villagers and fighters, and the devastation of homes 
and the countryside wrought by additional aerial bombardments by Iraqi forces, crushed 
the physical ability and emotional fortitude of Iraqi Kurds to carry on with ambitions for 
autonomy and an independent state.  Although the United States, the UN, and the 
European Parliament passed resolutions condemning Iraq for its chemical weapons use, 
no sanctions resulted from such use against Saddam’s regime.  U.S. policy on Iraq during 
the Iran-Iraq War constituted a direct threat to the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement.  
By disregarding the implications of selling dual-use chemicals and technologies to Iraq, 
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the United States implicated itself, alongside Saddam, in the downfall of the Iraqi 
Kurdish nationalist movement. 
 During the Cold War period from the Nixon era through the Reagan years, U.S. 
policy in the Persian Gulf region negatively impacted the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist 
movement.  From exploitative, covert ventures on behalf of Iran to chemical and 
weapons sales to Iraq, the United States’ Gulf policies carelessly and damagingly 
influenced Iraqi Kurdish ambitions.  In devising those policies on behalf of regional 
powers and capitalizing on Iraqi Kurdish aims, the United States indifferently obstructed 
the nationalist movement.  Although the movement resurfaced in later years with some 
success, U.S. involvement continued along the same lines of limited support with no 
overt diplomatic backing.  The Kurdish proverb, “The only friends we have are the 















403 The Kurdish Project 
104 
 










Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act, CREST Document Number: 
0001030207, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001030207.p
df (accessed December 9, 2018). 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act, CREST Document Number: 
CIA-RDP84S00927R0002001300004-
5, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP84S00927R000200130004-5.pdf (accessed May 12, 2017). 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act, CREST Document Number: 
CIA-RDP85M00363R000400740033-
5, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP85M00363R000400740033-5.pdf (accessed May 12, 2017). 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act, CREST Document Number: 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640026-
2, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-
00965r000302640026-2 (accessed May 12, 2017). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and 
Iraq, 1969-1972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 
53, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d53 (accessed 
April 7, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and 
Iraq, 1969-1972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), Chapter 
2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/ch2 (accessed 
April 7, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and 
Iraq, 1969-1972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 
200, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d200 




Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and 
Iraq, 1969-1972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 321, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321 (accessed 
June 28, 2017). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and 
Iraq, 1969-1972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), Summary, par. 
33, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/summary 
(accessed April 7, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and 
Iraq, 1969-1972, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 328, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d328 (accessed 
June 28, 2017). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-
1976, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 
207, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d207 (accessed 
June 28, 2017). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-
1976, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 
252, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d252 (accessed 
July 14, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-
1976, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 
253, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d253 (accessed 
August 11, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-
1976, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 
275, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d275 (accessed 
August 11, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-
1976, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 
106 
 
276, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d276 (accessed 
August 11, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-
1976, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 
278, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d278 (accessed 
August 11, 2018). 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-
1976, eds. Monica Belmonte and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2012), Document 
286, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d286 (accessed 
September 22, 2018). 
Gwertzman, Bernard. “Rogers Quits, Kissinger Names.” New York Times (1923-Current 
File), August 23, 1973, found within ProQuest Historical Newspaper: New York 
Times (1851-2009), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/08/23/archives/rogers-quits-
kissingernamed-rogers-resigns-kissinger-named.html (accessed March 20, 2019). 
 
Latham, Aaron. “A 24-PAGE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: THE CIA REPORT THE 
PRESIDENT DOESN’T WANT YOU TO READ. The Pike Papers: An 
Introduction by Aaron Latham.” the village VOICE, February 16, 
1976, http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%20Files/P%
20Disk/Pike%20Committee%20Report%20Village%20Voice/Item%2005.pdf 
(accessed December 1, 2015). 
 
Stout, David. “William P. Rogers, Who Served as Nixon’s Secretary of State, Is Dead at 
87,” New York Times (1923-Current File), January 4, 2001, found within 
ProQuest Historical Newspaper: New York Times (1851-
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/04/us/william-p-rogers-who-served-as-
nixon-s-secretary-of-state-is-dead-at-87.html (accessed March 20, 2019). 
 
United Nations, Security Council Resolution 348 (1974) of 28 May 1974, S/RES/348 
(1974), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/67/IMG/NR028967.pdf (accessed 
July 7, 2018).  
 
United Nations, Security Council, Document S/16433, “Report of the Specialists 
Appointed by the Secretary General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Concerning Use of Chemical Weapons,” March 26, 




Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold 
War [Electronic Resource]. 
107 
 
2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/ebooks/ebc/9780199375691 (accessed November 
24, 2015). 
 
Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran: The Pahlavis and After, 2nd ed. London: Pearson Longman, 
2007. 
 
Bengio, Ofra. The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2012. 
 
Bronson, Rachel. Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with 
Saudi Arabia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Charountaki, Marianna. The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International relations in the 
Middle East since 1945. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
 
Entessar, Nader. Kurdish Politics in the Middle East. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2010. 
 
Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship. 3rd ed. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001. 
 
Gibson, Bryan R. Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
 
Gunter, Michael M. The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem 
in Iraq and Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
Hahn, Peter L. Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. 
 
Izady, Mehrdad R. The Kurds: A Concise Handbook. Washington, D.C.: Taylor & 
Francis International Publishers, 1992. 
 
Jentleson, Bruce W. With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994. 
 
Khalidi, Rashid. Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle 
East. Boston: Beacon Press, 2009. 
 
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979. 
 
----------. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999. 
 




Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East 
Terror. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003. 
 
Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012. 
 
Marr, Timothy. The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
 
McDowall, David. The Modern History of the Kurds. 3rd ed. London: I.B. Tauris & Co 
Ltd, 2000. 
 
Nixon, Richard. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 
1978. 
 
Palmer, Michael A. Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the 
 Persian Gulf, 1833-1992. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 
 
Sargent, Daniel J. A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign 
Relations in the 1970s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
 
Schofield, Richard. “Position, Function, and Symbol: The Shatt al-ʿArab Dispute in 
Perspective.” In Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War [Electronic Resource], edited 
by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, 29-70. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004. https://link-springer-
com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu/book/10.1057%2F9781403980427 (accessed 
March 13, 2019). 
 
Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Tyler, Patrick E. “Officer Says U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas,” New York 
Times August 18, 2002, (accessed June 25, 2017). 
 
Tyler, Patrick. A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East−from the Cold 
War to the War on Terror. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of 
Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
109 
 
